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ADVISORY NONPREEMPTION 
SARAH E. LIGHT* 
ABSTRACT 
We are living in an era of dramatic and unpredictable 
technological and business innovation. Federal agencies have 
been at the forefront of updating substantive legal rules to meet 
new challenges not originally contemplated by Congress. Yet 
some innovations—for example, autonomous vehicles—also upset 
longstanding allocations of authority between the federal and 
state governments. Significant uncertainty about whether local or 
national concerns will predominate as innovations develop 
requires temporary flexibility in allocations of regulatory 
authority. This Article identifies a new method that federal 
agencies can use to promote such flexibility before the initiation of 
a rulemaking or before Congress acts to address such 
disruptions—advisory nonpreemption. Ordinary preemption shifts 
the balance of power from the states to the federal government. 
Advisory nonpreemption has the opposite effect. Advisory 
nonpreemption can open a dialogue among the federal 
government, the states, interest groups, and industry not only 
about the best substantive rules to address innovation, but who 
ought to govern and enforce those rules. Most importantly, 
advisory nonpreemption is a method of inserting de facto dynamic 
jurisdiction temporarily into an existing dual federalism scheme. 
This Article both describes advisory nonpreemption and defends 
its use as a normative matter using autonomous vehicle safety 
regulation as a case study. The approach’s costs in temporary 
regulatory uncertainty are outweighed by its benefits in promoting 
innovation, transparency, and the public interest.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Innovations in technology are rapidly transforming people’s lives. 
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) promise to revolutionize how we get from 
place to place, to improve mobility for those unable to drive, to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, and, most importantly, to reduce human driver 
error.1 Unmanned aerial systems (drones) may not only deliver books 
more quickly from Amazon, but also facilitate “precision agriculture.”2 
Smart homes and appliances can set thermostats to reduce energy demand, 
and can order more milk when supplies run low.3 Smart textiles with 
embedded sensors can transform how people interact with their clothing, 
with significant potential in medical and military contexts, among others.4 
Technology is likewise transforming the business models that deliver these 
products and services. For example, the sharing or platform economy is 
upending longstanding legal relationships among people, goods, and 
services.5 Each of these innovations may follow an unpredictable path. For 
example, we do not yet know whether automated vehicle technology will 
replace human drivers, rendering steering wheels obsolete and cars fully 
“driverless,” or whether instead technology will enhance or assist human 
driving capabilities. Nor do we know whether local concerns—such as 
weather differences, local driving norms, or urban density—will render 
fully driverless cars, also known as “Highly Automated Vehicles,” 
(HAVs) a more local than national phenomenon.6 And while innovation 
often holds great promise, it can likewise harm users or third parties.7 The 
 
 
1.  See infra, Part II (discussing risks and potential benefits of autonomous vehicles).  
2.  Farhad Manjoo, Think Amazon’s Drone Delivery Idea is a Gimmick? Think Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/technology/think-amazons-drone-
delivery-idea-is-a-gimmick-think-again.html?_r=0; Chunhua Zhang & John M. Kovacs, The 
Application of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems for Precision Agriculture: A Review, 13 PRECISION 
AGRICULTURE 693 (2012).  
3.  Ry Crist, Best Smart Home Devices of 2017, CNET (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.cnet.com/topics/smart-home/best-smart-home-devices/. But see Stacey Higginbotham, 5 
Reasons Why the ‘Smart Home’ is Still Stupid, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2015, 12:32 PM), 
https://perma.cc/DB53-W8GV.  
4.  Introduction, SMART FABRICS SUMMIT (Apr. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/959W-UU7C.  
5.  Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 
335–37 (2017) (favoring a precautionary approach to the allocation of regulatory authority when 
business and technological innovation create uncertain, but potentially significant, environmental, 
health, or safety impacts). 
6.  See infra, Part II, and note 146, which distinguishes different levels of vehicle automation, 
including the dividing line between vehicles with at least some automated technologies (AVs), and 
HAVs, which are a subset of AVs in which the vehicle can perform all driving tasks without human 
intervention under some circumstances, and which are the subject of the case study I address here. 
7.  Some of these harms may be local in nature, such as vehicle crashes, while others may be 
national in scope, as evidenced by the recent nationwide hack of major websites via connected devices 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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law has traditionally protected us from significant risks; yet the law cannot 
always keep pace with the uncertainties of innovation.8  
Innovation can challenge settled understandings of substantive legal 
rules, such as whether a robot can form the requisite “intent” to commit a 
crime, or whether an Uber or Lyft driver is an “employee” or “independent 
contractor,” and may require the reconsideration of existing legal 
categories.9 But innovation can also upset the balance of regulatory power 
among the federal, state, and local governments.10 Federalism disruption 
occurs when the existing allocation of authority is based on an assumption 
regarding certain basic facts about regulated technologies or forms of 
business, and innovations challenge that assumption.11 For example, the 
federal statute that has regulated motor vehicle safety in the United States 
for the past fifty years delegates authority to the federal government to 
regulate the safety of the “vehicle” to the exclusion of state legislation or 
regulation.12 States retain primary authority to regulate “driver” behavior 
through insurance, licensing, and common law tort rules.13 This general 
 
 
like baby monitors. Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/bu siness/internet-problems-
attack.html?_r=0. 
8.  There is a distinction between risk, in which it is possible to calculate the probability of an 
event occurring, and uncertainty, in which it is not possible to calculate this risk. See FRANK H. 
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921); see also Daniel Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 
901, 903 (2011) (citing Knight and distinguishing risk from uncertainty).  
9.  See Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulating Business Innovation 
as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (offering a 
theory of when business or technological innovation leads to policy disruption, and a framework for 
policy responses). Not all technological or business innovation leads to policy disruption. Whether 
policy disruption arises depends upon a number of factors, including how tightly legal rules are bound 
to existing business models and technologies, and whether the innovations raise the same or new 
policy concerns as compared to incumbents. Id.  
10.  Cf. Light, supra note 5, at 339–40 (arguing that the rise of the sharing economy upsets 
longstanding federalism equilibria relating to environmental impacts of transportation).  
11.  Cf. Biber et al., supra note 9. Federalism disruption is arguably one specific form of policy 
disruption. Here, I do not advance the overbroad claim that all innovation creates federalism 
disruption. Rather, I limit the scope of this article to those innovations that do raise such federalism 
challenges, and how agencies can respond by balancing the twin aims of promoting innovation and the 
public interest in periods of uncertainty about the impacts of such innovations.  
12.  National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle Safety Act), 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) 
(2012). As of the date this Article went to press in September, 2017, the House of Representatives had 
passed a bill entitled the Self-Drive Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr3388/BILLS-115hr3388eh.pdf, which would specifically 
address safety regulation of HAVs by preempting state regulations regarding vehicle “design, 
construction, or performance” that are not identical to federal safety standards, but which would not 
preempt state common law. The Senate has yet to act on this bill or propose its own alternative. 
Because this Article focuses on how federal agencies can address innovation uncertainty in a time-
limited fashion, either before initiating a notice-and-comment rulemaking, or before Congress adopts 
new legislation to address a federalism disruption, a critique of the House bill is outside the scope of 
the Article.  
13.  A savings clause provides that federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt state 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/6
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dividing line between state and federal authority was sensible at a time 
when vehicles and human drivers could be separated into two distinct 
categories, and both economies of scale in vehicle manufacturing and 
interstate transportation arguably favored uniform federal safety rules for 
vehicles.14  
The rise of HAVs erodes the line between vehicles and drivers, creating 
a federalism disruption. Vehicle hardware and software can now perform 
functions once exclusively in the control of humans behind the wheel. 
While concerns regarding economies of scale in manufacturing and 
interstate spillovers remain, the rise of HAVs raises a number of new 
concerns. For example, the most significant benefit of HAVs is arguably 
their ability to reduce accidents that result from human error.15 But if 
HAVs cannot drive safely in snow or heavy rain, they may be terrific in 
Nevada but terrible in Maine. Different states may have compelling 
reasons to want different rules not only for human drivers, but for vehicles 
themselves. It may therefore be the case that HAVs will become a local, 
rather than national phenomenon. On the other hand, if HAVs move out of 
local testing grounds and begin to cross state lines more frequently, 
different state rules for HAVs could themselves be the cause of accidents. 
And HAVs and human drivers are likely to be sharing the roads for some 
time, raising additional safety concerns. Such “innovation uncertainties” 
can arise temporarily, including questions about what the most significant 
risks and benefits of the activity are; how those risks and benefits will be 
distributed locally, regionally, and nationally; what path the innovation 
may take in its development, and the timing of that development, among 
others.16  
 
 
common law. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e). In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 
(2000), the Court read the savings clause narrowly, holding that a state tort suit for failure to equip a 
vehicle with an airbag was preempted, because the operative federal motor vehicle safety standard 
adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) specifically afforded 
manufacturers a choice of two passive restraints, and requiring airbags would interfere with the policy 
of affording a choice. However, more recently, the Court clarified in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of 
America, Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 335 (2011), that state common law tort claims are not preempted if 
federal standards merely provide a safety floor. One key distinction between these cases was the 
agency’s evolving view of the savings clause, as the Court gave some deference to NHTSA’s views in 
each case. Compare Williamson, 562 U.S. at 335 (“[T]he Solicitor General tells us that [NHTSA’s] 
regulation does not preempt this tort suit.”), with Geier, 529 U.S. at 883 (affording deference to agency 
position that the state tort suit was preempted). 
14.  Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 281, 317 (2003) (discussing this rationale for uniform federal rules).  
15.  See infra Part II.  
16.  One way to address such uncertainties would be to ban the new technology until greater 
certainty is achieved. Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401–78 
(2016) (favoring temporary bans on innovation while information is gathered about an emerging risk). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Uncertainties about whether local concerns about safety, zoning, 
tailpipe emissions, or land use, or national concerns about safety, national 
security, privacy, greenhouse gas emissions, economies of scale, or 
interstate spillovers will predominate, or whether policy differences 
among states themselves create new risks, raise important questions about 
which level of government should decide how to govern now. But these 
uncertainties can also raise questions about who should decide in the 
future. Some recent scholarship has examined the substantive question of 
how (and whether) to regulate in the face of uncertainty.17 And many 
jurists and scholars have recognized the general value of policy 
experimentation inherent in federalism, especially in cooperative 
federalism schemes, to address local variation in preferences or values.18 
The federalism literature is virtually silent, however, on a key question of 
regulatory design: how to inject temporary flexibility into the distribution 
of regulatory authority when regulators are not writing on a cooperative 
federalism blank slate. The auto industry has long argued that uniform 
 
 
However, such an approach fails to appreciate tradeoffs not only between benefits and risks, but 
between different kinds of risks. Specifically, a ban would fail to take into account the significant 
potential safety benefits of AV technology (benefits along the same axis of promoting safety), as well 
as benefits and potential harms along other dimensions. For example, AVs hold significant potential to 
reduce fossil fuel use in civilian transportation. JAMES M. ANDERSON, ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 29–30 (2016) (noting the potential for AVs to make use 
of platooning, lighter vehicles, and lighter batteries if the risk of crashes is reduced). On the flip side, 
however, if AVs reduce the costs associated with driving (for example, by permitting drivers to read or 
work while commuting), they may increase vehicle miles traveled and suburban sprawl. Id. at 37. 
Policymakers must take into account tradeoffs across these different risks. 
17.  See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8, at 903; Wansley, supra note 16, at 478 (favoring temporary 
bans on innovation while information is gathered, but not addressing federalism); Catherine Sharkey, 
Tort as Backstop to Regulation in the Face of Uncertainty, JOTWELL (Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/BAK7-ZGJQ (arguing that tort law can serve as a backstop “transition” legal regime 
before regulation). 
18.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”). See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS GOVERNMENT 49–51 (1930) (“[O]ur 
federalism calls for the free play of local diversity in dealing with local problems.”); see also Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 493 (1954). On the 
virtues of cooperative federalism, see, for example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism 
Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 955, 965–66 (2016) (discussing cooperation among federal 
and state executives in the face of congressional gridlock); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty 
and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 
1920, 1932 (2014) (arguing that cooperative federalism can yield “ever-more thoroughgoing state-
federal integration as states become sites of national policymaking and partisan conflict”); Abbe R. 
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law 
in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 589–92 (2011) (arguing that states play a crucial 
role in implementing and interpreting federal health care law); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, 
Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1766, 1769–70 (2015) (arguing that states can 
constrain the executive within cooperative federalism schemes).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] ADVISORY NONPREEMPTION 331 
 
 
 
 
national standards promote innovation, economies of scale, and address 
safety concerns better than fifty separate state rules.19 In contrast, I have 
argued that just as we may not want substantive law to freeze in place the 
technology or business models of the moment, an allocation of regulatory 
authority among the federal, state, and local governments to address 
innovation should remain flexible—at least for a short period of time.20 
Flexibility in federalism has value in times of innovation uncertainty. Just 
as we may not yet know the best substantive rules to address innovation, 
we may not yet know who will be the best regulator, or whether one “best” 
regulator exists at all.21 In focusing either on the virtues of cooperative 
federalism, or the best initial allocation of regulatory authority to confront 
a new problem, the existing literature has not addressed how to build 
temporary flexibility into an existing—and more rigid—allocation of 
authority.  
This Article identifies a new method that federal agencies can use to 
achieve this time-limited flexibility before initiating notice-and-comment 
rulemaking: advisory nonpreemption, and defends its use as a normative 
matter. Ordinary preemption shifts the balance of power from the states to 
the federal government.22 In contrast, advisory nonpreemption has the 
opposite effect. It is a federal agency’s informal, advisory statement in 
policy guidance (rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking) that it has 
authority to regulate in a particular area. But the statement does not 
actually preempt states from regulating—at least temporarily (hence the 
moniker “nonpreemption”). And the agency sets a timetable to revisit the 
issue.23  
 
 
19.  Alan Ohnsman, GM, Toyota and Lyft Urge Congress to Set Nationwide Self-Driving Car 
Standards, FORBES.COM (Feb. 14, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://perma.cc/J34N-LB5K; infra, notes 138, 
235, 241–243, 247, and accompanying text.  
20.  Light, supra note 5, at 362, n. 132 (leaving open the question of how to achieve this shift).  
21.  Id. But see David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1382 (2011) 
(arguing that scarcity of decisional resources in disaster-relief situations undermines flexible regimes’ 
success).  
22.  Cf. Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 222 (2012) 
(viewing congressional preemption as the dominant method of shifting the balance of power from the 
states to the federal government, but noting that agency interpretation has limited the need for 
preemption). 
23.  This opposite effect is distinct from “reverse preemption,” in which provisions in federal law 
give states the ability to veto federal agency decisions that conflict with state policy. Ann E. Carlson & 
Andrew Mayer, Reverse Preemption, 40 ECOL. L.Q. 583, 583 (2013). Notably, Congress could also 
pass new legislation that does not preempt state law, which would result in the same outcome. 
However, given the many hurdles involved in enacting legislation, federal agencies are likely to be 
more nimble in this regard, especially in response to rapidly changing innovations. William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441 (2008) (noting the 
difficulties of passing legislation and arguing that one primary effect of such procedural hurdles is the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
332 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:325 
 
 
 
We can view the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
(NHTSA’s) long-anticipated Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (2016 
NHTSA Policy) as an example of advisory nonpreemption.24 There, 
NHTSA offered its advisory interpretation of the terms “vehicle” and 
“vehicle equipment” in its authorizing statute, the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Motor Vehicle Safety Act), to include HAV 
hardware and software.25 Thus, in NHTSA’s view, HAV hardware and 
software are subject to federal motor vehicle safety standards.26 NHTSA 
noted that under the express terms of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 
federal motor vehicle safety standards preempt state performance 
standards that are not identical to federal motor vehicle safety standards.27 
However, the agency has not yet adopted such federal motor vehicle safety 
standards for HAVs, which must be adopted pursuant to notice-and-
comment rulemaking.28 Therefore, the agency used advisory language 
stating that it “strongly encourages States to allow [the Department of 
Transportation (DOT)] alone to regulate” HAVs.29 But NHTSA 
acknowledges that states may proceed notwithstanding the agency’s 
advisory approach, stating that “[i]f a State does pursue [highly automated 
vehicle] performance-related regulations,” the state should “consult” with 
NHTSA and follow the Model Policy set forth in the document.30 
 
 
delegation of lawmaking to agencies).   
24.  U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY TRAFFIC ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 1, 38 (2016) 
[hereinafter 2016 NHTSA Policy]; infra, Part II. 
25.  Id. at 38. 
26.  Id.  
27.  Id. at 38 (“If NHTSA issued [a federal motor vehicle safety standard] setting performance 
requirements for HAVs, then a State could not have its own performance standards on the same 
aspects of HAV performance unless they were identical to NHTSA’s standards.”) (emphasis added); 
49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (2012). For a discussion of the evolution of NHTSA’s “boilerplate” express and 
implied preemption language through 2012 in notice-and-comment rulemakings, see Catherine 
Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 542–44 (2012) (noting that after Geier, 
NHTSA amended its boilerplate language on both implied and express preemption, taking a more 
limited view of each). Since 2012, that language has remained consistent, with NHTSA routinely 
disclaiming preemptive intent with respect to state tort law, and concluding that its prescribed federal 
motor vehicle safety standard is only a “minimum” standard. See, e.g., Lamps, Reflective Devices, and 
Associated Equipment, 81 Fed. Reg. 6454 (Feb. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571); Electric 
Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 80 Fed, Reg. 2320 (Jan. 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571); Rear Visibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 19177 (Apr. 7, 2014) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571); Ejection Mitigation, 49 Fed. Reg. 55137 (Sept. 9, 2013) (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R. § 571); Bus Emergency Exits and Window Retention and Release, 77 Fed Reg. 19132 (Mar. 
30, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571) BB 14.2(b). The 2016 NHTSA Policy contains a 
conditional and abbreviated version of the express preemption boilerplate for state legislative or 
regulatory actions.  
28.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).  
29.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24, at 37. 
30.  Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/6
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NHTSA’s “If . . . then” statement about preemption further supports the 
conclusion that the Policy does not actually preempt state experimentation, 
because there is no federal law to preempt state action. The agency states 
explicitly that it anticipates revisiting the guidance in one year.31 Thus, 
even in this preexisting dual federalism scheme, states have continued to 
set rules for HAVs, and the federal government has advised against, but 
not foreclosed, this option.32  
Advisory nonpreemption serves multiple salutary purposes. First, it 
offers transparency by clarifying the agency’s current view of its 
regulatory authority in situations of innovation uncertainty both for the 
states and for regulated industry. This transparency can provide notice to 
the public and interested parties, including the states, before an agency is 
ready to initiate a more durable and long-term strategy of adopting notice-
and-comment rulemaking. This transparency can encourage early, 
meaningful participation in the ultimate rulemaking process (or, if 
Congress chooses to take up the issue, in debates before Congress). 
Second, advisory nonpreemption offers temporary flexibility in the 
allocation of regulatory authority if innovation takes an unpredictable 
path. And it is advisory, because while the federal agency believes it may 
hold leverage under the Supremacy Clause to preempt state law under its 
interpretation of the statute,33 the circumstances are sufficiently uncertain 
that technological development may undermine that leverage, or the 
agency may choose not to preempt state law at all.34 Thus, advisory 
nonpreemption can open a dialogue with states and industry; it does not 
shut the door.35 Although advisory nonpreemption imposes costs in 
regulatory uncertainty, it can promote normative values such as regulatory 
innovation, technological innovation, and an appropriate degree of 
precaution about local variation in the risks and benefits of that 
innovation. While this advisory approach lacks the procedural protections 
 
 
31.  Id. at 3.  
32.  While states could arguably regulate under such circumstances even in the absence of 
advisory nonpreemption, here, the federal agency is essentially advising that it will not issue 
preemptive federal motor vehicle safety standards for one year. For further discussion on why advisory 
nonpreemption is superior to agency silence, see infra Part I.B. 
33.  Heather K. Gerken, Comment, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 
118 (2014) (noting that Congress has a “supremacy trump card”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1300 (2009) (referring to Congress’s 
supremacy “trump card”). 
34.  Cf. Tim Wu, Essay, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1842 (2011) (arguing that informal 
agency action threatening substantive law enforcement can be desirable under conditions of 
uncertainty).  
35.  See infra, Part I.B.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of notice-and-comment rulemaking that are designed to promote 
democratic legitimacy,36 by not freezing for all time the policy preferences 
of past regulators, advisory nonpreemption promotes a different kind of 
democratic legitimacy in time. Most significantly, advisory nonpreemption 
can temporarily insert de facto dynamic, overlapping jurisdiction into an 
existing dual federalism scheme. This temporary dynamism can effectuate 
the goals of what I have called precautionary federalism, by affording 
federal and state regulators the chance to determine whether an existing 
allocation of authority can be applied to the innovation in the longer-term, 
or requires revision.37 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains why time-limited 
flexibility in the allocation of authority—what I have called precautionary 
federalism—is warranted under conditions of innovation uncertainty. It 
then introduces advisory nonpreemption as a mechanism that agencies can 
use to inject such time-limited flexibility into an existing allocation of 
regulatory authority before initiating notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Part II examines the rise of HAVs as a particularly compelling case study 
of how advisory nonpreemption can operate in practice to effectuate these 
goals. Part III turns to the role of the courts, examining how the judiciary 
might construe a statement of advisory nonpreemption if challenged. Part 
IV considers objections regarding democratic legitimacy, concluding that 
advisory nonpreemption enhances, rather than undermines, democratic 
legitimacy.  
I. PRECAUTIONARY FEDERALISM AND ADVISORY NONPREEMPTION 
Agencies and the executive branch have taken a leading role in filling 
substantive regulatory gaps—or even “gaping holes”—when new issues or 
facts arise that existing legislation does not directly address.38 This has 
 
 
36.  For discussions of different aspects of legitimacy in this context, see Abbe R. Gluck et al., 
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1839–44 (2015) 
(examining implications for democratic accountability, legitimacy, and transparency of unorthodox, 
informal action by agencies); Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of 
Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2015) (offering a skeptical view of recent process-
based defenses of administrative discretionary actions to update substantive law, and preferring a 
mixed positivist and process-based account); Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 443, 443 (2014) (discussing visions of legitimacy that include “centralized presidential 
control” responsive to majorities and “apolitical application of expertise”); Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Federalism Accountability: Agency-Forcing Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2128 (2009) (arguing that 
agencies are better than Congress at incorporating state interests in preemption debates, and proposing 
measures to increase the legitimacy and accountability of administrative action). 
37.  Light, supra note 5, at Part I.D (defining precautionary federalism, and distinguishing it 
from dual and dynamic federalism).  
38.  Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
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been true in areas as diverse as health care, education, telecommunications 
law, energy policy, and environmental protection.39 In addition, agencies 
are playing an increasingly important role in policing the bounds of 
federalism, a role that has subjected agency action in this sphere to 
significant criticisms.40 Those critiques have largely centered around 
agencies taking strong stands – in some cases, unauthorized by Congress – 
that state regulation or legislation is preempted, without taking adequate 
consideration of state interests in the administrative process.41 As I explain 
further below, advisory nonpreemption operates differently – it essentially 
ratifies some degree of state experimentation in the current absence of 
preemptive federal regulations. It also operates to open further dialogue 
between the federal government and the states, while tipping the agency’s 
hand as to its current view of the scope of its regulatory authority. 
Advisory nonpreemption therefore solves some of the problems that critics 
of agency preemption identify.  
But before turning to how advisory nonpreemption can inject 
regulatory flexibility into an existing dual federalism scheme, some 
context is required to understand why such flexibility is desirable. This 
 
 
(arguing that agencies are well situated to update legislation to address new problems like climate 
change in light of congressional gridlock); Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 
supra note 18, at 969 (discussing how cooperation among federal and state executives can lead to 
policy differentiation in the face of congressional gridlock); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In 
Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 265 (2013) (arguing that congressional delegation to 
agencies of the power to “unmake major statutory provisions” permits agencies to update laws in the 
face of partisan gridlock); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016) 
(discussing express delegations of administrative forbearance as a tool to address changed 
circumstances); Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 15–19 (2015) (arguing that in 
times of party polarization, “relatively broad (though not unconstrained) delegations of authority to the 
executive branch” along with deference to agencies can allow “significant social problems to be 
addressed”).  
39.  See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 38, at 279–84 (discussing health care and education); 
Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, supra note 18, at 976–79, 982–93 
(discussing health care, education, climate law); Freeman & Spence, supra note 38, at 17–63 
(discussing energy policy and climate law); Deacon supra note 38, at 1548 (discussing 
telecommunications law). 
40.  See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 27, at 521 (arguing that agencies are “ascendant” in 
preemption, and proposing procedural reforms to guard against potential abuses); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008) (arguing that administrative 
law is a constitutionally legitimate source of federalism governance); Nina A. Mendelson, A 
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008) (arguing that courts should 
apply a presumption against agency preemption in the absence of express delegation); Ernest. A. 
Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 869–70 (2008) (noting dangers of agency 
preemption in light of the lack of state representation within agencies). For a more favorable view, see 
Joshua Hawkes & Mark Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of Administrative Preemption, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 63 (2014).  
41.  See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 40 (proposing judicial limits on agency preemption).  
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Part therefore first describes the spectrum along which regulatory 
authority is allocated among the federal and state governments. At one 
extreme is “field preemption”—a form of dual federalism, in which the 
federal government is selected as the “optimal” regulator to the exclusion 
of the states. At the other end of the dual federalism spectrum lies state 
and local authority without federal involvement. In the middle lie the 
majority of allocations of regulatory authority, which often contemplate 
some concurrent role for both the states and the federal government. It 
then explains how precautionary federalism—which values the possibility 
of a temporary shift in the allocation of authority toward greater 
experimentation through regulatory overlap—is valuable during periods of 
innovation uncertainty.42 The second half of this Part then turns to the role 
that advisory nonpreemption can play in effectuating such a shift. Part II 
then examines the use of advisory nonpreemption by the NHTSA in the 
context of HAV safety regulation as a case study to tease out more specific 
implications.  
A. Federalism Spectrum: Dual, Dynamic, and Precautionary  
In any legal regime, there is some division of labor between the federal 
government and the states.43 The federal government can retain regulatory 
primacy to the exclusion of the states. The states can regulate in the 
absence of, or with the imprimatur of, federal rules. Or there can be some 
form of concurrent authority. Such divisions can be express or implied.44 
And while Congressional text is the touchstone of preemption analysis, 
recently, the Court has afforded deference to agency interpretations of 
statutory text with preemptive effect, even in cases in which Congress has 
not delegated specific authority to the agency to preempt state law, but 
 
 
42.  See Light, supra note 5, at 361.  
43.  Many scholars of federalism—traditionally viewed as encompassing only the federal 
government and the states—now incorporate local governments into the analysis. See, e.g., Nestor M. 
Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 959, 995–1000 (2007) (rejecting the unitary vision of local government as solely part of the 
states); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term: Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22–23 (2010) (discussing the role of local and sublocal governments in 
federalism theory); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 568 (2008) (favoring local participation in immigration regulation and 
enforcement); Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 360–61, 361 n.37 (Kalyani Robins 
ed., 2015) (citing scholarship on this point); cf. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New 
Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 378–79 (2001) (discussing similarities between “federalism” and 
“localism”). 
44.  Congress may expressly or impliedly preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause. U.S. 
CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] ADVISORY NONPREEMPTION 337 
 
 
 
 
merely has delegated general authority to implement the substantive terms 
of the statute.45  
Federalism scholarship has launched a virtual cottage industry of 
adjectives to describe different allocations of authority and their value.46 
But two overarching categories are dual and dynamic federalism. In a dual 
federalism regime, the question is whether either the federal government 
or the states can adopt “optimal” legal rules to address the problem at 
hand.47 Significant interstate spillovers, the need to promote economies of 
scale, a concern that states will “race to the bottom” to adopt lax rules, or 
significant national interests like privacy or national security tend to favor 
federal uniform rules to the exclusion of state authority.48 In contrast, a 
desire for regulatory competition, significant differences in local 
preferences, significant local impacts that predominate over national 
impacts, and democratic values like citizen participation in government, 
tend to favor states as optimal.49 Positive political theory, also known as 
public choice theory, offers a descriptive account of why interest groups 
tend to favor certain forums over others.50  
Layered on top of these theoretical constructs are actual allocations of 
federal and state authority in different statutes, with the boundaries policed 
by courts and agencies. These allocations are not binary, but rather exist 
 
 
45.  On the role of agencies versus courts in preemption, see sources cited supra note 40; infra, 
Part III.  
46.  Light, supra note 5, at 336, 336 n.9 (discussing different forms of dynamic federalism).  
47.  See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
570, 570–71 (1996) (discussing rationales favoring federal rules); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211–12 (1992) (rejecting the argument that states race to the 
bottom); David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 477–78 (2013) (favoring state, rather than federal, control over 
hydraulic fracturing); David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 
351–52 (2014) (examining rationales for state and local governance of hydraulic fracturing); Richard 
B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210–15 (1977) (examining theories favoring 
state or federal governance). 
48.  See sources cited, supra note 47. 
49.  See sources cited, supra note 47; see also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, 
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 36 (1996) (discussing the matching principle, which favors 
regulation at the smallest level of government that captures negative and positive impacts of the 
targeted activity).  
50.  Esty, supra note 47, at 597–99 (discussing public choice rationales as to why industry and 
interest groups favor federal or state forums); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV 553 (2001) (rejecting the assumption that 
environmental interest groups are more successful in a federal forum); Spence, Federalism, Regulatory 
Lags and the Political Economy of Energy Production, supra note 47, at 466 (discussing public choice 
accounts of federalism and interest group behavior). 
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along a spectrum. At one extreme end of the dual spectrum is “field 
preemption,” in which Congress or a court has determined that the federal 
regime is so pervasive that no other regulatory action by the states or local 
governments is permitted. An example is how Congress has chosen to 
regulate our nation’s airspace in the Federal Aviation Act.51 In the absence 
of express preemption language, courts have held that the Act nonetheless 
impliedly preempts the entire field of airspace regulation based on 
Congressional intent.52 Congress has authorized the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to adopt regulations governing the national airspace 
above a certain height, including its use, as well as aircraft safety and 
noise.53 And the FAA’s regulations interpreting the Act, adopted through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, have been held to “demonstrate an intent 
to occupy exclusively the entire field of aviation safety.”54 Often in cases 
of field preemption, such federal uniform rules advance significant 
policies, including concerns that conflicting state rules regarding airspace 
would create an unsafe regulatory “patchwork,” or that uniform rules are 
needed to promote industrial economies of scale in the manufacture of 
vehicles or training of pilots who travel through the airspace. As another 
example, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) authorizes the 
Department of Transportation to set motor vehicle fuel economy standards 
for new vehicles.55 The EPCA contains express preemption language 
prohibiting any state or local government from adopting or enforcing “a 
law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel 
economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy 
standard under this chapter.”56 Courts have interpreted this provision 
broadly to preempt state and local governance not only of vehicle 
manufacture, but also efforts to make local taxi fleets more fuel-efficient 
 
 
51.  Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, and 44701–44735 (2012).  
52.  Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468, 470 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Federal 
Aviation Act “preempts the entire field of aviation safety from state and territorial regulation” despite 
lack of express language, finding intent in the law’s “structure and purpose”); French v. Pan Am 
Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the Federal Aviation Act preempts state law 
relating to pilot drug testing to avoid a “crazyquilt effect”); Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 
2502 (2012) (“Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in 
the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 
374, 386–87 (1992).  
53.  49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, 44701–44735. The delegation includes a “catch-all” provision 
that vests the FAA with authority to regulate “other practices, methods, and procedures the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.” 49 U.S.C. § 
44701(a)(5).  
54.  Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 471.  
55.  49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 501.3(a)(1)(i) (2013). 
56.  49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2012). Express preemption language using the words “related to” is 
construed broadly. See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins, 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995); Morales, 504 U.S. at 383–84.  
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or less polluting through environmentally preferable purchase rules.57  
At the opposite end of the dual federalism spectrum, the states and local 
governments can regulate without any federal involvement. The most 
extreme example is an allocation of authority in which any state or local 
regulator may act unhindered by federal rules or preemption. Such 
freedom for the states may arise as a result of federal inaction, 
deregulation, or conscious design. For example, Michael Dorf and Charles 
Sabel call for greater “democratic experimentalism.”58 In democratic 
experimentalism, power is decentralized to state and local governments, 
and the role of a regional or the national government is merely one of 
coordination to ensure the sharing of knowledge to promote benchmarking 
and diffusion of regulatory successes.59 
Alternatively, rather than “dual,” the balance of regulatory authority 
between can be “dynamic.” In dynamic federalism, there is regulatory 
overlap or concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and state 
governments.60 Unlike the search for a single, optimal regulator in dual 
federalism, which promotes certainty and uniformity, dynamic federalism 
recognizes the value of multiple regulatory voices, not only horizontally in 
the states, but vertically across the federal and state governments.  
Most allocations of authority seem to occupy this middle ground. Often 
there is a role for both the federal and state governments, and some aspects 
of the regulatory scheme involve dual federalism with preemption of state 
law, while other aspects of the regulatory scheme permit state 
experimentation or greater concurrent jurisdiction.61 For example, in 
 
 
57.  Light, supra note 6. 
58.  Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314 (1998). 
59.  Id.  
60.  For discussions of different forms of dynamic federalism, see, for example, David E. 
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental 
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1798–99 (2008) (discussing ecosystems as a theoretical 
model for dynamic federalism); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and 
the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1555–56 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, 
Asymmetrical Regulation] (discussing the value of concurrent, dynamic overlap in the form of federal 
“floor preemption” in which states may exceed federal standards); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s 
Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 
145 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise]; Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and 
Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099–1100 (2009) (noting the value of iterative interaction 
among regulators in dynamic federalism); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic 
Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176–77 (2006) (favoring dynamic concurrent 
regulatory authority); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 243, 244 (2005) (“Polyphonic federalism . . . seeks to harness the interaction of state and national 
power to advance the goals associated with federalism.”). 
61.  Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
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federal “floor” preemption, the federal government can set a regulatory 
minimum standard as a baseline, but states can exceed that baseline.62 One 
example of this dynamism is the California waiver provision for vehicle 
emissions standards in the Clean Air Act.63 Specifically, there are 
potentially two standards for vehicle tailpipe emissions under the Clean 
Air Act: the federal standard which provides a floor, and the California 
standard, which must be “at least” as protective of human health and the 
environment as the federal floor.64 While there is some regulatory 
experimentation in this dynamic scheme, there can be no more than two 
standards, as only the state of California can apply for the waiver in the 
first instance. Other states may then adopt California’s standard if the EPA 
grants the state a waiver. The statute specifies in advance the bases upon 
which the EPA may grant California this waiver, and the factors that other 
states must meet if they wish to adopt California’s standards.  
Another allocation that occupies this middle ground is cooperative 
federalism, which shares features of both dual and dynamic regimes, and 
has received a great deal of attention in recent federalism scholarship.65 In 
cooperative federalism, the federal government sets performance standards 
that states must meet, but leaves it up to the states to determine how to 
meet those standards. For example, in the Clean Air Act, the federal 
government sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria air 
pollutants like ozone, but directs each state to adopt its own state 
“implementation plan” to meet those standards.66 The federal and state 
governments both play a role in addressing the problem of ambient air 
quality, as in dynamic federalism. But as in dual federalism, it is the 
federal government that both sets the standards, and retains the ability to 
override a state implementation plan that it deems insufficient.67 And 
statutes like the No Child Left Behind Act and the Patient Protection and 
 
 
293 (2016).  
62.  Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 60, at 1555–56. 
63.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012) (noting that compliance with the California standard, if 
preemption is waived by the EPA, constitutes compliance with the Act); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7507 
(2012) (noting that states in non-attainment areas may adopt California’s standards).  
64.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). The EPA is delegated authority to grant or deny this waiver. Id.  
65.  On the ascendance of cooperative federalism, see Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, supra 
note 18, at 1765–71 (discussing how cooperative federalism “represents the reality of U.S. governance 
. . . [and] a critical means by which agencies and the executive branch can advance policy in a 
polarized world”); Gluck, supra note 36, at 1792, 1802, 1804, 1806–07, 1813–18, 1820, 1833, 1851–
52 (discussing cooperative federalism mechanisms in the Affordable Care Act); Bulman-Pozen & 
Gerken, supra note 33 (focusing on states within cooperative federalism schemes).  
66.  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 108(b)(2), 109(d)(2)(c), 7408(b)(2), 7409(d)(2)(C) (2012). 
67.  Clean Air Act, § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2012) (providing for a federal 
implementation plan if the Administrator disapproves of the state implementation plan).  
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Affordable Care Act contain elements of cooperative federalism.68 Recent 
scholarship has noted that cooperative federalism in particular allows 
states to influence national policy by “dissenting” within a federal 
regime.69  
In dynamic federalism, different regulators can influence each other’s 
policies over time, just as California and the federal government have with 
respect to vehicle tailpipe emissions standards.70 Dynamic federalism 
recognizes the value of experimentalism and the possibility of tailoring to 
locally varying conditions.71 At the same time, however, dynamism can 
undermine regulatory certainty and finality,72 or could lead to under-
regulation in a tragedy of the “regulatory commons.”73 
These allocations of authority embody varying degrees of regulatory 
flexibility. A dual regime in which there is field preemption is not 
particularly flexible to address changed circumstances or innovation that 
might raise issues of concern to the states. In contrast, a cooperative 
federalism scheme incorporates a greater degree of flexibility to shift the 
boundaries of regulatory primacy between the federal government and the 
states if conditions warrant such a shift to address a federalism disruption.  
Elsewhere, I have argued that principles of risk regulation should 
inform the allocation of regulatory authority among the federal 
government, the states, and local governments—a principle I have called 
precautionary federalism.74 Taking a precautionary approach to federalism 
requires taking uncertainty and risk-risk tradeoffs into account in the 
 
 
68.  Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18, at 977, 987–88 (discussing the Affordable Care Act and the 
No Child Left Behind Act); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken supra note 33, at 1282 (discussing the No Child 
Left Behind Act); Metzger, supra note 18, at 1772–86 (discussing the Affordable Care Act). 
69.  See Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism, supra note 18, at 953 (interaction between federal 
and state executive branch officials can promote national policies with state differentiation); Bulman-
Pozen & Gerken, supra note 33 (state participation in cooperative federalism can promote 
differentiation in the service of national interests); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 
(2013); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 
1893 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1996 (2014); Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 
YALE L.J. 2094 (2014); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and 
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016) (noting that state differentiation 
can promote national energy policy). 
70.  Carlson, supra note 60, at 1099–1100.  
71.  See sources cited supra note 60. 
72.  Schapiro, supra note 60, at 290. 
73.  William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2003) (arguing that regulators will underinvest in regulation in cases of 
jurisdictional overlap). 
74.  Light, supra note 5, at 360–65.  
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allocation of regulatory authority.75 Precautionary federalism requires 
regulatory authority to remain fluid and flexible during periods of 
innovation uncertainty, capable of shifting over time in response to 
unpredictable paths of innovation.76 Precautionary federalism has three 
primary features. First, it sets a default presumption that greater regulatory 
flexibility and overlap (dynamism) are warranted when uncertainty about 
an innovation in technology or business is at its height to promote 
experimentation. However, that presumption can be overcome if policy 
diversity is itself a source of concern, or if other values outweigh the value 
of experimentation.77 Second, precautionary federalism recognizes that 
policymakers must take into account risk-risk tradeoffs—such as the 
potential tradeoffs between vehicle safety and environmental protection 
noted above—because addressing one set of regulatory concerns can raise 
other concerns along the same axis or other axes.78 Finally, precautionary 
federalism is limited in time. When greater certainty exists about the 
impacts of innovation, it may be necessary or appropriate to shift to more 
uniform (dual) rules.79 That discussion, however, left open the question of 
what method or methods can achieve these precautionary shifts.80 It is 
therefore to the mechanics of advisory nonpreemption that I now turn.  
B. Advisory Nonpreemption 
It is black-letter law that federal agencies have three primary means of 
regulating: adjudication,81 rulemaking,82 and a third category of more 
informal methods such as interpretive rules, “general statements of 
policy,” and statements of “best practices.”83 The third category has been 
subject to criticism for lacking the procedural safeguards of ordinary 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.84 But others have defended the use of 
informal methods to preserve substantive regulatory flexibility.85 And 
 
 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id.  
77.  Id.  
78.  Id.  
79.  Id.  
80.  Id.  
81.  5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012). 
82.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
83.  5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A)–(B) (2012); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 
(2006) (discussing agency adoption of “best practices” as an informal tool of agency action that can 
promote horizontal harmonization of state policies).  
84.  5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(A)–(B) (2012); Gluck et al., supra note 36 (discussing the recent rise of 
“unorthodox” rulemaking).  
85.  Wu, supra note 34, at 1841 (recognizing that agency threats are desirable in periods of 
business or technological innovation); Zaring, supra note 83 (defending “best practices” as a way of 
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many scholars have noted the increasing frequency of their use. 86  
In addition to their role in substantive regulation, agencies play an 
important role in policing the bounds of federalism, either through their 
power of statutory interpretation or through preemption.87 Congress may 
expressly delegate authority to agencies to preempt state law, as in the 
delegation to the Secretary of Transportation to determine whether state 
law that conflicts with federal regulation of hazardous waste transportation 
is preempted,88 or to the Federal Communications Commission to preempt 
state laws with the effect of prohibiting an entity from providing interstate 
telecommunications services.89 In other cases, Congress has delegated 
authority to an agency to interpret the substance of a statute, but that 
substantive interpretation may have preemptive effect. For example, 
Congress has delegated to NHTSA the authority to adopt federal motor 
vehicle safety standards under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.90 But there is 
no additional delegation of authority to determine which state laws are 
preempted. Likewise, Congress has delegated to the FAA the authority to 
define what constitutes “navigable airspace.”91 How the FAA interprets 
what constitutes “navigable airspace” may likewise have significant 
implications for whether there remains a role for states in regulating the 
safety of technological innovations like drones.92 
As a tool, preemption operates as a one-way ratchet—albeit one upon 
which agencies do not always insist—in which the federal law blocks state 
law.93 The allocation of authority moves from multiple regulatory voices 
 
 
promoting flexible governance).  
86.  Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1137 (2014) (discussing differences between administrative law in practice and textbook 
models); Gluck et al., supra note 36 (arguing that administrative law must account for new methods of 
lawmaking and rulemaking); Wu, supra note 34, at 1841; Zaring, supra note 83. 
87.  See, e.g., Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 27, at 521 (noting rise in agency 
preemption and advocating measures to routinize consultation with states); Metzger, supra note 40, at 
2023 (noting rise in agency preemption); Mendelson, supra note 40, at 695 (arguing that courts should 
not defer to agency preemption determinations, especially in the absence of express delegations); 
Young, supra note 40, at 869–70 (highlighting risks of agency preemption).  
88.  See 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d) (2012); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (authorizing the Secretary of 
the Interior to determine which state laws or regulations are preempted). 
89.  47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a), (d) (2012). 
90.  49 U.S.C. §§ 30101, § 30111 (2012) (“The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor 
vehicle safety standards” that are objective and practicable, and meet the need for vehicle safety.) 
91.  49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012).  
92.  Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
354 (2016). See infra note 107 (noting that in Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the 
D.C. Circuit struct down an FAA regulation requiring non-commercial recreational drone users to 
register with the FAA, but suggesting that a registration requirement is different from safety-related 
rules).  
93.  As an example of an agency not insisting on preemption, in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of 
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to one in the federal government. Of course, cooperative federalism 
schemes are one notable exception. Flexible dynamics within cooperative 
federalism schemes permit some fluidity in the relationship between the 
federal government and the states, when values about policy conflict.94 But 
cooperative federalism is not the only game in town. Despite widespread 
and longstanding reports of the demise of “dual” federalism,95 even 
regimes that contemplate a role for both the federal government and the 
states sometimes incorporate preemption of state law in certain spheres, 
including the regulation of vehicle safety, the regulation of toxic 
chemicals, and other statutes designed to protect health, safety, and the 
environment. Any account of how to build flexibility into federalism must 
address not only cooperative federalism or other dynamic regimes in 
which this flexibility is built in ex ante, but also regimes in which there are 
distinct spheres of federal and state authority. It is within this context that 
advisory nonpreemption should operate in cases of a federalism 
disruption: when drones challenge how the FAA should define the 
nation’s “navigable airspace,” or HAVs challenge what counts as a 
“vehicle.” While the federal government has been the lead regulator in 
both areas in the past, the jury is still out as to whether federal regulatory 
primacy should remain.96 Advisory nonpreemption is one method to 
achieve shifting boundaries on a temporary basis in this context. 
Advisory nonpreemption is an agency’s public statement in policy 
guidance in response to such federalism disruption—before it initiates any 
notice-and-comment rulemaking—about how it interprets its delegated 
authority from Congress, and whether its interpretation gives it the power 
to regulate the innovation.97 It has three salient characteristics. First, the 
agency states publicly its interpretation of the law, including what it 
considers to be the preemptive effect of its interpretation; yet it does not 
actually preempt state regulation. Thus, it clarifies the agency’s position 
based on the current state of innovation, but leaves room open for revision. 
Second, advisory nonpreemption operates for an expressly limited period 
 
 
America, Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 335 (2011), the Supreme Court held that state tort law was not preempted 
by the federal Vehicle Safety Act, giving some deference to NHTSA’s position against preemption. 
94.  Metzger, supra note 18, at 1769–70; Gluck, supra note 36, at 1792, 1802, 1804, 1806–07, 
1813–18, 1820, 1833, 1851–52; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 33, at 1256.  
95.  Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1950); Ernest A. 
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 259 (2011) (contending that after the New Deal, “the Court’s federalism 
doctrine has generally abandoned dual federalism’s notion of separate spheres in favor of a regime of 
concurrent jurisdiction”).  
96.  See infra, note 107 (discussing recent regulations governing recreational drone use). 
97.  If an agency were delegated express preemption authority, see supra notes 88–89, advisory 
nonpreemption could include a statement about the preemptive effect of its interpretation.  
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of time only, and must be reevaluated on a periodic basis to determine 
whether the need for flexibility to promote innovation outweighs the costs 
of uncertain regulatory rules. Third, an agency uses its “informal” 
authority, such as policy guidance, rather than notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedure to adopt advisory nonpreemption. In a chronology, 
advisory nonpreemption would come before the agency is even prepared 
to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking—as a NOPR would require the 
agency to publish “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved.”98 Advisory 
nonpreemption is therefore more flexible than a rulemaking because it 
remains subject to revision over a shorter period of time, and with fewer 
procedural hurdles the agency can respond to changing circumstances or 
the unforeseeable path that innovations may take.99 Thus, advisory 
nonpreemption can transform—at least temporarily—a dual federalism 
regime with uniform federal rules or federal regulatory primacy into a 
flexible regime in which there is dynamic, overlapping jurisdiction. In this 
sense, advisory nonpreemption achieves the opposite of what ordinary 
preemption contemplates, because it facilitates a temporary shift from 
uniformity to policy variation.100  
Table 1 offers a schematic of how advisory nonpreemption fits into 
other federalism frameworks:101 
  
 
 
98.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012). In the ordinary course of agency rulemaking under § 553(b), 
an agency first publishes a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), then accepts comments from the 
public, and then publishes a Final Rule. However, in actual practice, there are many additional steps 
that can occur prior to the publication of a NOPR, including when the agency gives notice to the public 
of its annual Regulatory Plan and Regulatory Agenda, as well as the very early stage step of publishing 
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. For a summary of the various stages of the rulemaking 
process, see OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.  
99.  However, there are also costs to this informality. See infra, Parts III, IV.  
100. In addition, advisory nonpreemption offers a temporary imprimatur upon state action in 
the regulatory sphere, while recognizing that this state action may be superseded by the adoption of 
regulations pursuant to rulemaking, or new legislation by Congress.  
101. Thanks to Julian Davis Mortenson for discussions about this chart. 
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Table 1 
 
 Federal Government 
Regulating  
 
Federal Government 
Not Regulating 
 
 
 
 
Preempting 
 
Dual Federalism 
 
e.g., Federal drug labeling 
laws preempt state labeling 
laws 
 
Field Preemption 
e.g., Tort reform—even in 
the absence of federal 
regulation states are 
prohibited from 
regulating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not 
Preempting 
 
Cooperative Federalism 
 
e.g., Federal government 
regulates but states can 
obtain waivers of federal 
requirements, states can 
implement federal 
standards, or states can 
exceed federal requirements 
 
Advisory 
Nonpreemption 
 
e.g., In a Dual Federalism 
regime, agency publishes 
policy guidance 
indicating its intention 
with respect to 
preemption, but does not 
actually preempt state law 
 
 
Advisory nonpreemption therefore shares some of the benefits of 
cooperative federalism during periods of innovation uncertainty. But 
because not every existing regulatory scheme contemplates some form of 
overlapping jurisdiction to fit into a cooperative federalism box, advisory 
nonpreemption affords a mechanism to move from the upper left box of 
dual federalism temporarily into the realm of greater decentralized 
experimentation. Whether the regulatory allocation at some point will 
move back to dual federalism, or into a more cooperative federalism 
approach when there is greater certainty about the innovation’s impacts 
remains an open question.  
A critic of this approach might note that another mechanism—silence 
by federal regulators—could likewise fit into the lower-right hand box. 
Agency silence also has no preemptive effect. Why, critics might argue, is 
silence not enough to achieve the same end? The key distinction is a 
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matter of transparency. When an agency simply remains silent, this affords 
no insight into the agency’s developing views, for example, whether it 
sees a continuing role for federal involvement or not. In contrast, advisory 
nonpreemption provides transparency into an agency’s current and 
developing thinking in a way that puts potentially affected communities on 
notice that they should speak up if they wish to influence the ultimate 
regulatory scheme.102  
While it might be tempting to make light of the value of “merely 
clarifying” an agency’s position, this is actually an extremely significant 
benefit of a transparent approach like advisory nonpreemption. Indeed, in 
surveying the legislative history, text, and purpose of those sections of the 
APA that authorizes agencies to rely in their dealings with the public only 
on rules that have been published, Peter Strauss has argued forcefully that 
Congress’s goal was “putting an end to secret law.”103 Advisory 
nonpreemption would qualify as such a “publication rule,” alongside other 
agency actions like guidance, “interpretive rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”104 Such 
statements ensure that agency officials apply the law consistently, and 
“[c]itizens are better off if they can know about these instructions and rely 
on agency positions, with the assurance of equal treatment such central 
advice permits, than if they are remitted to the discretion of local agents 
and to ‘secret law.’”105 While HAVs offer a high-profile case in which the 
regulated community is concentrated in a manageable number of firms 
manufacturing such vehicles, other cases of innovation may have more 
diffuse regulatory targets, which could raise serious concerns about local 
discretionary whims. For example, many private individuals are 
purchasing drones for recreational use.106 Imagine a world which lacked a 
clarity regarding whether such people were required to obtain a license 
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or from their state or 
 
 
102.  While one option would be for the agency to indicate its view that it has the power to 
preempt state law, an agency could likewise announce that there are some aspects of a regulatory 
problem that the agency anticipates leaving to the states. One could think of this as an advisory safe 
harbor provision. Thanks to Dan Farber for discussions on this point.  
103.  Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper 
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2001) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1), 
(2) (2012)). Strauss includes in the umbrella of “publication rules” those “interpretive rules, statements 
of general policy, staff manuals, and the like” that are published (or such that parties have actual 
notice), and thus upon which the agency may rely in its “dealings with the public.” Id. at 804. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(2) (2012).  
104.  Id. at 806 (citing the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)). 
105.  Id. at 808. 
106.  Carol Pogash, Santa Delivered the Drone. But Not the Safety and Skill to Fly Them, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/business/drone-safety-risk-popular.html.  
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local government before flying their drone on their street. In the absence 
of some public guidance from the agency, individual bureaucrats might 
take conflicting positions, such as fining or penalizing some drone users, 
but leaving others to fly their drones without penalty. Publication rules 
would ensure that members of the public were treated consistently in this 
regard.107  
And while it might be important in general that agency interpretations 
are not made in secret to ensure consistent application of the law, this 
clarification is especially important under conditions of innovation 
uncertainty. First, publication provides some guidance to the regulated 
community as to the agency’s thinking about its authority, especially as 
that thinking evolves over time in response to changing circumstances and 
the development of technology. It also puts the states and state regulators 
on notice of the agency’s intentions moving forward, so that states whose 
views conflict with the agency interpretation have notice of its potential 
preemptive effect and can participate meaningfully in the administrative 
process.108 It can also ensure that the agency is even-handed with respect 
to state interests and concerns. This allows for more informed dialogue 
among the regulated community, the states, and the federal agency 
regarding not only the best substantive rules but also how to allocate 
authority. Several scholars have raised the concern that because states lack 
formal representation within agencies, state interests will not be taken into 
account in the agency preemption decisions.109 They advocate greater 
consultation.110 Advisory nonpreemption can initiate such consultation in a 
very public way. And in cases of federalism disruption—in which both the 
federal agency and the states may have significant expertise on the issue 
because the innovation blurs the boundaries of who should be regulating—
 
 
107.  In fact, the FAA recently adopted regulations governing drones that attempted to 
preempt many state and local rules, and to require a federal license and registration for model aircraft 
such as drones. A number of states and local governments nonetheless sought to regulate their use. See 
14 C.F.R. § 101 (governing hobby and recreational use of drones); § 107 (governing non-recreational 
use of drones); National Conference of State Legislatures, Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law 
Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-
unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx (last updated Oct. 7, 2016). On May 19, 2017, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that recreational drone users could not be compelled 
to obtain a license from the FAA, and struck down the so-called Registration Rule as barred by the 
explicit text of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089 
(D.C. Cir. 2017).  
108.  This meaningful participation has been a key concern. See Sharkey, supra note 27, at 
522 (favoring improved internal agency procedures to ensure meaningful state participation).  
109.  Id.; Mendelson, supra note 40, at 718.   
110.  Sharkey, supra note 27, at 522. This recommendation is consistent with the 
Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) regarding agency 
preemption, Administrative Conference of the United States, 76 Fed. Reg. 81–01, 2001 WL 5751 
(adopted Jan. 3, 2011), as well as Executive Order 13,132, Federalism, 3 C.F.R. 206 (Aug. 4, 1999).  
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this dialogue becomes all the more important. To require additional 
procedures along the lines of notice-and-comment rulemaking before an 
agency could publish its interpretation of the governing statute would 
potentially discourage agencies from publishing these statements of 
policy, and the public, states, and the regulated community would lose 
these important benefits.111 
In light of a proliferation of scholarship on the benefits and limitations 
of informal agency actions in recent years, it is important to define what 
advisory nonpreemption is not. While advisory nonpreemption 
communicates the agency’s views on the proper sphere of its regulatory 
authority in the face of innovation, it is not the federalism equivalent of 
what Tim Wu has called an “agency threat,” or what Lars Noah has called 
“administrative arm-twisting.”112 An agency threat is a statement that the 
agency intends to take enforcement action and can occur in “a wide variety 
of informal agency activity” such as “warning letters, official speeches, 
interpretations, and private meetings with regulated parties,” 113 but not in 
“mere policy guidelines, studies, [and] reports.”114 Wu’s “paradigmatic 
example” of a threat is either a “warning letter sent to the company” that 
the agency intends to take enforcement action,115 or a “public speech given 
by an agency chair, describing what the agency believes to be 
unacceptable behavior, coupled with an explicit or implicit threat of either 
new rulemaking or enforcement of an existing rule.”116 In a similar vein, 
Noah defines administrative arm-twisting as when an agency threatens “to 
impose a sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging 
‘voluntary’ compliance with a request that the agency could not impose 
directly on a regulated entity.”117 Examples of arm-twisting include 
conditions imposed during licensing proceedings, conditions imposed 
during government contracting and procurement, efforts to promote 
voluntary recalls when an agency lacks formal recall authority, and 
conditions imposed in consent decrees that exceed statutory requirements, 
 
 
111.  Strauss, supra note 103, at 808–09 (rejecting calls for greater proceduralization of 
publication rules by the D.C. Circuit as both beyond what the APA requires, and bad as a matter of 
policy).  
112.  Wu, supra note 34, at 1842; Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of 
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 873, 875 (1997) (discussing the risks and 
benefits of informal agency actions).  
113.  Wu, supra note 34, at 1843–44. 
114.  Id. at 1844. 
115.  Id.  
116.  Id. 
117.  Noah, supra note 112, at 874.  
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among others.118  
Advisory nonpreemption is different. First, agency threats are directed 
to a particular regulatory target, or to the regulated community as a whole. 
Advisory nonpreemption, in contrast, speaks to two audiences—both 
regulated community and the states. It clarifies the agency’s current view 
of its regulatory authority in situations of uncertainty for those two 
audiences. Second, advisory nonpreemption, though informal, is arguably 
more formal than the types of actions Wu considers agency threats. A 
public speech would not be sufficient to shift the balance of regulatory 
authority between the federal government and the states. Third, advisory 
nonpreemption is not an attempt at a federal power-grab; quite the 
opposite. Unlike the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s efforts to 
obtain an agreement by a drug manufacturer to “preclear all of its 
promotional materials” with the agency for two years—something to 
which it was not legally entitled119—in advisory nonpreemption, Congress 
has already delegated authority to the agency to regulate in this area and 
the agency has regulated the area in the past. And it is “advisory” rather 
than a “threat” because the federal agency opens a dialogue with states and 
regulated industry for a specified period of time; it does not shut the 
door.120  
We can view as an example of advisory nonpreemption the statement 
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in its 2016 Policy 
that the federal government has authority to regulate HAV hardware and 
software as “vehicles” and “motor vehicle equipment,” but that does not 
expressly preempt state experimentation.121 The policy has been published, 
and the agency engaged actively both with the public and the regulated 
community, as well as with states, before adopting this policy. The Policy 
itself seeks comment from the public, and envisions a collaborative 
dialogue with industry and the states about the agency’s ongoing role to 
police HAV safety.122  
 
 
118.  Id. at 876–895. 
119.  Id. at 892.  
120.  See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, xiii (2011) (examining 
evidence of intergovernmental bargaining); see also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2011); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 18. 
121.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24; infra, Part II. 
122.  Advisory nonpreemption is also unlike “best practices” regulation. Zaring, supra note 
83, at 308. Best practices may be most appropriate for situations in which “the precise content of the 
standard is not particularly important.” Id. at 294. In contrast, the precise allocation of authority 
between the federal government and the states is extremely important for AVs; however, in light of 
innovation uncertainty, we cannot say for sure which allocation is best. Safety rules for vehicles are 
arguably extremely important, as vehicle crashes cause approximately 38,000 deaths and many more 
injuries in the United States annually. Motor Vehicle Deaths Increase by Largest Percent in 50 Years, 
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To summarize, advisory nonpreemption offers several important 
benefits. First, it preserves flexibility in the allocation of regulatory 
authority as technology or business innovation develops. In times of 
uncertainty, just as we do not yet know what will be the best policy, we do 
not yet know if there is a best regulator, or if multiple regulatory voices 
are best.123 Concerns regarding economies of scale, interstate spillovers, or 
policy conflict that might weigh in favor of uniform, federal rules must be 
weighed against the possibility that local variation in conditions will 
predominate over these interstate concerns. And in periods of rapid 
innovation, technology may develop in unpredictable ways. For example, 
if HAVs cannot drive safely in snow or heavy rain, driverless cars may be 
excellent in the desert Southwestern United States, but unworkable in parts 
of New England during the winter such that “enhanced human driving” 
might be a preferable goal.124 HAVs may become a more local than 
national phenomenon, and different states may need different rules not 
only for drivers, but for vehicles themselves. Second, by permitting more 
regulatory voices to speak under conditions of uncertainty, advisory 
nonpreemption can serve as precautionary about important policy goals 
like safety.125 If we knew that fully driverless cars were better than 
enhanced human driving, a uniform national rule might make sense. But 
right now, it is not clear whether one is preferable in all contexts. Local 
experimentation can yield important information about safety that a 
uniform rule might not. Alternatively, while the federal government may 
not want stringent, mandatory safety rules for HAVs at this time, the state 
of California might.126 Advisory nonpreemption permits these voices to be 
heard in the early stages of innovation, rather than definitively shutting 
them down. And by adopting a time-limited policy, advisory 
nonpreemption puts the states, interest groups, and industry on notice that 
the federal government may begin a rulemaking process to claim 
jurisdiction formally, such that if states wish to have a say or influence 
that process, now is the time. 
Having described the essential features of advisory nonpreemption, the 
 
 
NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL (Feb. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/L5E3-6FWE. Accordingly, advisory 
nonpreemption provides temporary flexibility until a better answer—not the importance of the issue—
becomes more apparent.  
123.  Light, supra note 5.  
124.  Neal E. Boudette, 5 Things That Give Self-Driving Cars Headaches, N.Y. TIMES (June 
4, 2016), https://perma.cc/P9FD-FJKZ.  
125.  Light, supra note 5.  
126.  In fact, the state of California does currently desire more stringent safety measures than 
the federal government. See infra, Part III.  
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next Part offers HAV safety regulation as a case in which to explore its 
use in practice. Part III will then turn to the normative analysis that weighs 
the benefits and costs of advisory nonpreemption, and will address the role 
of courts and the level of deference that is owed to this type of agency 
action.  
II. ROBOT FEDERALISM: THE RISE OF AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
The rapid development of HAV technology offers a particularly 
compelling case study to highlight both why federal agencies should 
preserve temporary flexibility in the allocation of regulatory authority to 
address innovation uncertainty, and how they can achieve this flexibility. 
This Part first examines the division of labor that has existed between the 
federal government and the states for fifty years to regulate auto safety, 
and argues that the development of HAV technology is challenging that 
division of labor. It then discusses the current state of HAV regulation at 
the federal, state, and local levels. It concludes by demonstrating that 
NHTSA’s 2016 adoption of advisory nonpreemption in policy guidance 
retains an appropriate degree of temporary flexibility in the allocation of 
regulatory authority at this time.  
A. Federalism in Auto Safety Regulation 
For the past fifty years, a division of labor between the federal 
government and the states has existed regarding the regulation of motor 
vehicle safety. Under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Congress has 
delegated to the federal Department of Transportation responsibility for 
regulating the design of “motor vehicles” and “motor vehicle equipment” 
to ensure their safety.127 The Department then sub-delegated that authority 
to NHTSA. The statute defines “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle driven or 
drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public 
streets, roads, and highways,” and “motor vehicle equipment” as: 
(A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally 
manufactured; 
 
 
127.  National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30183; H.R. Rep. 
No. 89-1776, 10 (1966) (discussing the need for legislation to promote safety). For a thorough account 
of the development of this regulatory regime, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and 
Control to Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. 
ON REG. 167 (2017). With the rise of HAVs, this is a rapidly changing area of the law, within NHTSA, 
the states, and now within Congress. See supra note 12. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] ADVISORY NONPREEMPTION 353 
 
 
 
 
(B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for 
replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as 
an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle.128 
Pursuant to its delegated authority, NHTSA issues federal motor vehicle 
safety standards (FMVSS) governing new motor vehicles.129 Vehicle 
manufacturers must self-certify compliance with these standards, which 
govern matters like placement of essential controls “within reach of the 
driver,” headlights, vehicle brake systems, placement and performance of 
rearview mirrors, occupant impact protection requirements, child restraint 
systems, and other safety features.130 NHTSA also has the authority to 
recall vehicles when safety concerns arise.131  
The Act preempts non-identical state legislation and regulations: 
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, 
a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or 
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of 
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if 
the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this 
chapter.132  
However, the states have a continuing role to play. The Act expressly 
provides that state common law is carved out of this preemption language, 
and the Supreme Court has interpreted this carve-out to apply if federal 
standards merely provide a “floor” rather than a ceiling for vehicle 
performance.133  
In addition, in contrast to the federal emphasis on vehicle safety, the 
states, by and large, are responsible for regulating human drivers, 
including through licensing, insurance rules, and traffic safety laws.134 
Although the statute does define a “driver,” NHTSA defines the term 
“driver” in its regulations as “the occupant of the motor vehicle seated 
immediately behind the steering control system.”135 Such a definition is 
necessary for purposes of vehicle safety standards such as the requirement 
that the rearview mirror or other controls be within the view or reach of 
 
 
128.  49 U.S.C. §§ 30102(a)(7), 30107(a)(8). The definition also includes devices like helmets 
designed to protect user safety that are not relevant to this inquiry.  
129.  49 U.S.C. §§ 30101, 30111; 49 C.F.R. Part 571.  
130.  49 C.F.R. Part 571. 
131.  49 U.S.C. §§ 30118–30120 (authorizing recalls).  
132.  49 U.S.C. § 30103 (emphasis added).  
133.  See Vehicle Safety Act, supra note 12. 
134.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24, at 38.  
135.  49 C.F.R. § 571.3. 
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the driver,136 but has implications for how the states may regulate HAVs.  
B. Autonomous Vehicle Innovation 
The development of HAV technology raises complex technological, 
ethical, and regulatory questions. Advocates tout the many benefits of 
HAVs, including their potential to reduce traffic and congestion; to 
provide mobility to the elderly, children, and people with disabilities; and 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by optimizing traffic flow.137 But the 
single most important benefit of HAVs is arguably their potential to 
improve safety.138 According to the National Safety Council, there were 
38,300 fatalities as a result of motor vehicle accidents in 2015—an eight 
percent increase over the previous year.139 Studies have demonstrated that 
ninety-four percent of vehicle crashes arise from “human choice or 
error.”140 HAVs hold promise to reduce the number of accidents by 
reducing human error, such as those caused by distracted driving, driving-
while-texting, and driving under the influence of alcohol.141  
On the other hand, however, are competing concerns that as HAV 
technology is developing, new and different kinds of accidents may occur. 
Such new types of accidents may result from driver “complacency” that a 
vehicle is more “autonomous” than it actually is, such that the driver fails 
to monitor and take over from technical systems when needed.142 Or 
accidents could result from technological failure like the vehicle sensors’ 
inability to distinguish between a light-colored oncoming truck and a grey 
sky or white clouds in the background.143 Accidents may also result from 
conflicts between algorithms governing different models of HAVs. For 
example, if two HAVs are driving down the road in opposite directions, 
and a pedestrian walks in front of them, what does each vehicle’s 
programming tell it to do? Would a uniform algorithm governing how 
both HAVs would respond prevent harm better than different 
 
 
136.  49 C.F.R. § 571. 
137.  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Transp., Secretary Foxx Unveils President Obama’s F17 
Budget Proposal of Nearly $4 Billion for Automated Vehicles and Announces DOT Initiatives to 
Accelerate Vehicle Safety Innovations (Jan. 14, 2016) (noting potential of AVs to enhance “safety, 
mobility, and sustainability”).  
138.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 1, 31  
139.  NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 122. 
140.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24, at 5. 
141.  DAVID A. MINDELL, OUR ROBOTS, OURSELVES: ROBOTICS AND THE MYTHS OF 
AUTONOMY 5 (2015). 
142.  Id. at 26.  
143.  Id. at 26; Anjali Singhvi & Karl Russell, Inside the Self-Driving Tesla Fatal Accident, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/9JY3-6276 (discussing crash involving a Tesla in self-
driving mode); MINDELL, supra note 141 (discussing driver complacency).  
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algorithms?144 Or are accurate and uniform systems for vehicles to 
communicate with other vehicles sufficient to prevent accidents?145  
Such new problems could also arise because vehicle automation is not 
binary, but rather exists along a continuum. And vehicles at different 
points along that continuum of automation are likely to be sharing the 
roads for some time.146 At one end of the spectrum are ordinary cars 
lacking any automated features. In the middle are vehicles with some 
automated features like parking assistance or collision warning systems, 
but that still require a human driver to make strategic decisions. At the far 
end of the spectrum are vehicles that NHTSA calls “Highly Automated 
Vehicles” or “HAVs”—in which the automated systems can perform all of 
the driving tasks that a human otherwise could.147 Some of these HAV 
systems contemplate a continuing role for a human driver under certain 
conditions, while others take a different approach. For example, Google’s 
former self-driving car project, now an independent spin-off technology 
 
 
144.  Ariel Wittenberg, Helping to Build ‘Moral Machines’ at MIT, GREENWIRE (Oct. 18, 
2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060044432 (quoting William J. Ford Jr., Executive Chairman 
of Ford Motor Co., as saying, “Could you imagine if we had one algorithm and Toyota had another 
and General Motors had another? We need to have a national conversation about ethics, because we 
have never had to think about these things before, but the cars will have the time and ability to do it.”).  
145.  It is important to distinguish between “automated vehicle technologies,” which are the 
focus of this article, and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication technologies, though the two are 
“complementary.” U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., FACT SHEET, VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY 3 (Dec. 13, 2016). V2V technology can be employed in any vehicle—with a human 
driver or without—to facilitate communication between vehicles. V2V technology “expand[s] sensing 
performance” beyond the systems employed by single vehicles, such as LIDAR, radar, or cameras, and 
can, for example warn the “driver” not to enter an unsafe intersection or to make a left turn into 
oncoming traffic. Id. On December 13, 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to 
mandate V2V technology in all new light vehicles in the United States. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 
NHTSA, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; V2V 
Communications, 49 C.F.R. § 571 (submitted for publication in the Federal Register). There is a strong 
argument for a federal uniform common language if all vehicles are meant to communicate with one 
another.  
146.  After using its own classification system for several years, in 2016, NHTSA adopted the 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) International taxonomy that separates AVs into six levels of 
automation. See 2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24, at 9–10 (citing SAE International Standard 
J3016, http://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf). An SAE Level 0 vehicle lacks 
automation. A Level 1 vehicle can assist the driver with certain tasks; while a Level 2 vehicle can 
“actually conduct” certain tasks, but the human driver both monitors the automated systems and must 
conduct other tasks. A Level 3 vehicle can conduct driving tasks, but a human driver must be ready to 
retake control. A Level 4 vehicle is fully automated “and the human need not take back control, but the 
automated system can operate only in certain environments and under certain conditions.” A Level 5 
vehicle can “perform all driving tasks, under all conditions that a human driver could perform them.” 
NHTSA considers only Levels 3–5 “highly automated vehicles” (HAVs) subject to its 2016 Policy. Id. 
147.  Id. at 10. The term “autonomous” should not be read to imply no human involvement; 
human programmers and engineers designed the vehicle and its software to behave in certain ways. 
MINDELL, supra note 141, at 220 (“[A]utonomy is human action removed in time.”) (emphasis in 
original).  
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firm called Waymo, is currently testing driverless vehicles that lack a 
steering wheel, accelerator, and brakes, having concluded that humans 
cannot be counted on to monitor and take over from automated systems 
safely.148 How HAVs interact with unpredictable human drivers remains 
an open question.149 
Although NHTSA contends that the hardware and software are part of 
the “vehicle” and its “equipment” (favoring federal regulatory primacy), 
there is another interpretation. The hardware and software of such HAVs 
would, in another legally relevant sense, be the “drivers.” The vehicle and 
its software would control not only the physical actions of acceleration, 
braking, and steering in the moment, but also strategic, tactical, and ethical 
judgments about how to avoid collisions. Human drivers must constantly 
make judgment calls and draw upon principles of decision, for example, 
about whether to obey the law or to violate it in order to promote a higher 
need for safety or to preserve life.150 Considering these issues, ethicists 
have asked how an HAV should respond to the famous “trolley problem.” 
151 Given a choice between saving the vehicle’s single human passenger, 
and saving multiple passengers in an oncoming bus, what choice should 
the vehicle make? A recent empirical study published in Science 
concluded that while people generally believe that HAVs should sacrifice 
vehicle passengers for the greater good, people do not “actually want[] to 
buy one for themselves” if they will be sacrificed.152 Perhaps in response 
to this concern, Mercedes recently announced that the automaker would 
prioritize saving the life of the driver and vehicle occupants.153 In 2015, 
 
 
148.  Waymo, www.waymo.com/journey.  
149.  James R. Haggerty, These Drivers are Not Crazy: They’re Just Doing the Pittsburgh 
Left, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/these-drivers-are-not-crazytheyre-just-
doing-the-pittsburgh-left-1484926356 (noting challenges for AVs facing the local norm of yielding to 
drivers turning left when the light changes).  
150.  Id. at 26 (offering the example of whether to break the law by crossing the double-
yellow line in the middle of the road to avoid a crash).  
151.  Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985) (discussing 
ethical challenges posed by the hypothetical case of whether to save one person or five at risk from a 
runaway trolley) (citing Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in 
VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHERS ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (1978) (originating the trolley 
problem). Again, this question of how a vehicle would respond to such a situation is distinct from the 
question of whether the vehicles can communicate with one another to sense each other’s presence. 
See supra note 145 (discussing V2V communication).  
152.  Jean-Francois Bonnefon, Azim Shariff & Iyad Rahwan, The Social Dilemma of 
Autonomous Vehicles, 352 SCIENCE 1573, 1575 (2015) (discussing AV ethics as a classic “social 
dilemma” and noting that participants did not wish to enforce utilitarian sacrifices by regulation). 
153.  Michael Taylor, Self-Driving Mercedes-Benzes Will Prioritize Occupant Safety Over 
Pedestrians, CAR & DRIVER (Oct. 7, 2016), http://blog.caranddriver.com/self-driving-mercedes-will-
prioritize-occupant-safety-over-pedestrians/ (“If you know you can save at least one person, at least 
save that one. Save the one in the car.”).  
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the head of what was then Google’s self-driving car project argued that 
such situations do not arise frequently, if at all, although it is a “fun 
problem for philosophers to think about.”154 Another Google engineer 
contended that such a scenario would mean that the vehicle “made a 
mistake a couple of seconds earlier.”155 
It is not only such deeply philosophical issues that implicate concerns 
about HAV safety and the boundaries of federalism. HAVs must also be 
prepared to make more mundane decisions like whether the vehicle can 
safely make a left turn across the path of oncoming traffic, or pass another 
vehicle on the highway before the road turns.156 HAV technology must 
thus incorporate not only technical knowledge regarding how to parallel 
park or how to distinguish between the sky and a light-colored oncoming 
vehicle to avoid a collision, but principles of decision that embody 
judgment. Those judgment calls, strategic decisions, and the mistakes that 
may have preceded them in fully autonomous vehicles would be made not 
by human drivers in the moment, but rather by vehicle algorithms 
programmed in advance by human engineers. This narrative would favor 
state regulatory primacy over such algorithms—at least, perhaps over the 
software. It is hardly beyond the capacity of well-designed software to 
recognize that an HAV has crossed state lines and to apply different rules, 
just as a human driver knows to change speed limits, or a motorcyclist 
needs to put on a helmet when entering a different state. HAVs thus 
muddy the distinction between “vehicles” regulated by the federal 
government, and “drivers” regulated by the states. 
To add complexity, innovation’s path can be unpredictable. Describing 
these degrees of automation as a “continuum” could lead to the 
assumption that technological development will follow a linear path from 
our current state of affairs to a state of fully driverless cars in the future 
that lack steering wheels, brakes, and accelerators. And indeed, some 
 
 
154.  Matt McFarland, Google’s Chief of Self-Driving Cars Downplays ‘the Trolley Problem,’ 
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/12/01/goog 
les-leader-on-self-driving-cars-downplays-the-trolley-problem/.  
155.  Alex Hern, Self-Driving Cars Don’t Care About Your Moral Dilemmas, GUARDIAN  
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/22/self-driving-cars-moral-
dilemmas. 
156.  The first known collision between AVs occurred in 2007 between two vehicles built by 
MIT and Cornell participating in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Grand Challenge. 
MINDELL, supra note 141, at 204. The MIT car failed “to classify the other car as a moving object and 
to derive its future path.” Id. at 205. The MIT engineers had set a velocity threshold to distinguish 
between a moving object and a stationary object. Because the Cornell vehicle was “lurching,” rather 
moving at a consistent velocity, the threshold was not triggered. Id. The MIT car’s software concluded 
that the Cornell car was stationary, and drove in front of it. Id. at 204–05.  
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automakers and scholars envision such a world.157 For example, Google 
was a pioneer in promoting fully driverless cars—a mission now continued 
by spin-off firm Waymo.158 But it is important to question that 
assumption.159 Indeed, different firms developing HAV technology are 
staking out diverse positions about whether human drivers should remain 
in such vehicles in the future, or whether the ultimate goal of HAV 
technology development should be to remove human drivers entirely. And 
there is uncertainty about how long these developments will take. Even the 
former director of Google’s driverless car program recognized that its 
desired path to driverlessness might be longer than originally anticipated, 
and that it may proceed in stages, depending upon different local driving 
conditions.160 Engineer David Mindell of MIT has argued that assuming a 
linear path in which machines replace humans is a flawed and ahistorical 
assumption, in light of how automated technologies have developed in 
other contexts, such as in deep sea exploration and outer space.161 Other 
HAV manufacturers have staked out their position as favoring 
enhancement of human driver capabilities through automation, rather than 
replacement of human drivers. For example, CEO of the Toyota Research 
Institute Gil Pratt has described Toyota’s advanced driver assistance 
system as a “guardian angel” not a robotic “chauffeur.”162 At this moment, 
 
 
157.  PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2009); Matthew Yglesias, Morgan Stanley Predicts Utopian Society By 2026, 
SLATE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/02/25/morgan_stanley_on_au 
tonomous _cars_utopia_by_2026 .html; Tony Dutzik, Choose Your Own Utopia: What Will We Make 
of Driverless Cars, STREETSBLOG USA (Oct. 2, 2015), http://usa.streetsblog.org/2015/10/0 2/chose-
your-own-utopia-what-will-we-make-of-driverless-cars/; David Roberts, The Transformative Potential 
of Self-Driving Electric Cars, VOX (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/9/25/93980 63/self-
driving-electric-cars; Adrienne LaFrance, The High-Stakes Race To Rid The World Of Human Drivers, 
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/dr iverless-
cars-are-this-centurys-space-race/417672/. 
158.  Alistair Barr, Google’s Self-Driving Car Project is Losing Out to Rivals, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-12/google-car-project-loses-
leaders-and-advantage-as-rivals-gain (noting that “Google co-founder Larry Page insisted on complete 
human driver replacement” and that current CEO of Google’s Self-Driving Cars unit John Krafcik has 
said, “[f]ull autonomy, although much harder, is the right route”)’ Waymo, Technology, 
https://waymo.com/tech/.  
159.  MINDELL, supra note 141 (rejecting the myth of “linear progress” for AVs).  
160.  Lee Gomes, Google Self-Driving Car Will Be Ready For Some, In Decades For Others, 
IEEE (Mar. 18, 2016), http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/self-driving/google-
selfdriving-car-will-be-ready-soon-for-some-in-decades-for-others (quoting Chris Urmson, former 
Director of Google’s Self-Driving Cars Project, as saying driverless cars may take as long as thirty 
years to develop, and may be released “incrementally,” first, in places with favorable weather 
conditions “where the roads are easy to drive” before a rollout to additional locations). As a 
technology firm rather than an auto manufacturer, Waymo also faces the challenge of bringing these 
cars to market. Barr, supra note 158.  
161.  MINDELL, supra note 141, at 5, 10.  
162.  Lucas Mearian, A.I. Guardian-Angel Vehicles Will Dominate Auto Industry, Says Toyota 
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we do not know, and cannot predict with certainty, how HAV technology 
will develop, which visions of “autonomy” will predominate, and how 
long the diffusion of this technology will take. HAVs are likely to develop 
in fits and starts in perhaps unanticipated ways as people adjust to their 
changing role within HAV systems.163  
C. Federalism Disruption 
Congress did not envision robot cars when it drafted this bedrock 
legislation in 1966. This “old statute” must confront a “new problem” of 
how best to regulate HAVs as a substantive matter today, in their current 
state of being.164 To date, legal scholarship on the rise of autonomous 
vehicles has focused primarily on the ways in which the blurring of lines 
between driver and vehicle raises substantive questions about the 
application of existing tort, criminal, and privacy law.165 But I want to 
 
 
Exec, COMPUTERWORLD (June 3, 2016), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3079044/car-tech/ai-
guardian-angel-vehicles-will-dominate-auto-industry-says-toyota-exec.html. A 2016 survey conducted 
by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute demonstrated that only sixteen 
percent of respondents preferred to ride in a driverless vehicle, while forty-six percent wished to retain 
“full control” of a vehicle, and thirty-nine percent wanted a “partially self-driving vehicle.” For 
complete survey results, see Bernie DeGroat, Vehicle Automation: Most Drivers Still Want to Retain 
Some Control, U.MICH. (May 23, 2016), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/23935-vehicle-automation-
most-drivers-still-want-to-retain-at-least-some-control.  
163.  See Jeremy Hsu, 75% of U.S. Drivers Fear Self-Driving Cars, But It’s An Easy Fear To 
Get Over, SPECTRUM (Mar. 7, 2016), http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/self-
driving/drive rless-cars-inspire-both-fear-and-hope (discussing a AAA study finding that seventy-five 
percent of people are afraid to use self-driving cars, but that establishing trust between a person and an 
autonomous vehicle can occur established quickly) (citing Three-Quarters of Americans “Afraid” To 
Ride In A Self-Driving Vehicle, AAA NEWSROOM (Mar. 1, 2016), http://newsroom.aaa.com/2016/03/ 
three-quarters-of-americans-afraid-to-ride-in-a-self-driving-vehicle/); John Irwin, Public Not Sold On 
Fully Autonomous Vehicles, Study Finds, AUTONEWS (May 23, 2016), http://www.autonews.com 
/article/20160523/OEM06/160529968/public-not-sold-on-fully-autonomous-vehicles-study-finds 
(discussing age gap in preferences for AVs). But see Daniel Fuller, Tech Talk: Public Opinion of 
Autonomous Cars is Changing, ANDROID HEADLINES (June 30, 2016), http://www.androidheadlines. 
com/2016/06/tech-talk-public-opinion-of-autonomous-cars-is-changing.html (discussing people’s 
increasing comfort with the idea of AVs). 
164.  Cf. Freeman & Spence, supra note 38 (discussing the “new problem” of climate change). 
For example, NHTSA is reviewing all existing FMVSS to determine whether they pose conflicts or 
barriers to innovation for AVs. U.S. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & VOLPE, REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES: IDENTIFYING 
POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF AUTOMATED VEHICLES USING 
EXISTING FMVSS—PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (Mar. 2016). Potential conflicts or barriers include 
references to human drivers and other vehicle safety standards that could limit or affect AVs, such as 
requirements for vehicle steering wheels. Id. at ii. 
165.  See, e.g., Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1145 (2012) (discussing challenges for regulation, including safety and privacy concerns, but not 
discussing federalism); Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by 
Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157 (2012) (discussing the criminal liability issues 
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focus instead on the boundaries of federalism.  
Regulatory authority over HAV safety could be allocated in one of four 
ways. First, there could be no public regulation of HAV safety. Private 
vehicle manufacturers could simply incorporate their own visions of both 
the appropriate degree of autonomy and algorithms directing how the 
vehicle will respond in different circumstances in proprietary vehicle 
software, or more communally in private standards set by industry 
groups—Ford could use one standard and Waymo another, or they could 
voluntarily agree on a private industry standard.166 Second, HAV safety 
could be governed by the states, either through state tort law and the 
concept of the reasonable person (which would be applied to the 
algorithms controlling the vehicle), or through state regulatory and 
legislative standards for HAVs. Under the second approach, state rules or 
standards governing safe vehicle operation and principles of decision 
might intrude into what has traditionally been federal territory over vehicle 
design. But the states could claim that this is within their traditional 
authority to regulate human drivers—the human “drivers” here are simply 
in engineering labs, rather than in the vehicles. States have expertise in 
regulating behavior, and if vehicles are “behaving” in particular ways, then 
regulating that behavior draws on that expertise. Third, HAV safety could 
be governed exclusively by federal law. In this case, federal motor vehicle 
safety standards governing HAVs would arguably intrude into what has 
traditionally been state regulatory space governing operation of vehicles 
and behavior of drivers. Fourth, the federal government and the states 
could share authority in some fashion, perhaps through a scheme of 
cooperative federalism or floor preemption. Any dynamic approach, 
 
 
created by autonomous vehicles); Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1171 (2012) (discussing the confluence of autonomous vehicles and privacy laws); 
David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 117 (2014) (discussing products liability and AVs); Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the 
Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST 
J.L. & POL’Y 393 (2015) (discussing criminal law and AVs); Adam Thierer and Ryan Hagemann, 
Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339 
(2015) (arguing against regulating AVs); Ryan Calo, Robots in American Law (Feb. 24, 2016) (Univ. 
of Washington School of Law Working Paper No.2016-04 draft on file with author) (citing scholarship 
on civil and criminal liability, legal personhood, enforcement, speech, intellectual property, race and 
gender, and privacy, but not federalism) (manuscript at 33–34). For one exception discussing the 
division of labor between the federal and state governments, see Andrew R. Swanson, “Somebody 
Grab the Wheel!”: State Autonomous Vehicle Legislation and the Road to a National Regime, 97 
WASH. L. REV. 1085 (2014). For a summary for policymakers of technical and regulatory issues raised 
by autonomous vehicles which describes challenges for the allocation of federal and state regulatory 
authority, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 16.  
166.  Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 165, at 339 (arguing for “permissionless innovation” 
for AVs). 
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however, would raise the possibility of conflicting standards.167 These four 
options are reflected in Table 2. 
Table 2 
 
 
 
No Regulation – 
Private Standards, 
Self-Regulation   
 
 
Federal Motor Vehicle  
Safety Standards  
preempt state law 
 
 
States regulate in the absence 
of Federal Motor Vehicle  
Safety Standards 
 
 
Concurrent 
(dynamic) 
Jurisdiction 
 
What makes this case so challenging, however, is that policymakers 
must not only confront the allocation of regulatory authority given the 
state of technological innovation today. There may be additional 
innovation in the future—foreseen or unforeseen. This raises the question 
of whether the boundaries of federalism should be strictly determined or 
remain fluid. A great deal is at stake in these federalism questions, because 
conflicting rules among the states could themselves be the cause of 
accidents.168 The next section discusses the regulatory environment 
leading up to NHTSA’s 2016 adoption of advisory nonpreemption.  
D. Regulation of AVs Before 2016 
With that background in mind, I now turn to how theregulatory 
environment regarding AVs and HAVs has evolved over time. While the 
federal government has encouraged the development of AV technology 
through grants, studies, and prizes, NHTSA has not, to date, adopted 
binding federal motor vehicle safety standards for AV technology; nor has 
 
 
167.  See infra, Part III (discussing potential for federal-state conflict). 
168.  Light, supra note 5; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 16 (citing industry’s concerns over a 
“patchwork” of differing state rules).  
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Congress amended the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.169 This is not to say, 
however, that the federal government has been inactive or inattentive to 
these issues.  
1. Federal Policy 
At the agency level, NHTSA has been a vocal advocate of AV 
technology, but has proceeded slowly in addressing its safety risks. In 
2013, NHTSA announced its first Preliminary Statement of Policy 
regarding AVs, addressing the potential benefits of innovation, areas in 
which additional research would be required to ensure safety, and 
recommendations to states regarding AV testing.170 NHTSA identified 
three “related streams of technological change,” each of which raises its 
own technological and regulatory issues: (1) in-vehicle crash-avoidance 
systems; (2) Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications technology; and 
(3) self-driving vehicles (AVs).171 With respect to AVs, the 2013 Policy 
defined five levels of automation, noting that at that time it was “not aware 
of any prototype automated vehicle systems that are capable of operating 
on public roads without the presence of a driver in the driver’s seat who is 
ready to control the vehicle.”172 Much of the proposed research agenda 
thus focused on developing a safe “driver-vehicle interface.”173 The 2013 
Policy incorporated no language regarding preemption, but did 
recommend states not license self-driving vehicles other than for testing 
purposes.174 Therefore, all of the recommendations in the 2013 Policy 
“assume[ed] that the human driver of the vehicle” was employed by the 
entity testing the vehicle,175 and “strongly recommend[ed] that a properly 
licensed driver be seated in the driver’s seat and ready to take control of 
the vehicle while the vehicle is operating in self-driving mode on public 
roads.”176 
How quickly times changed. In November, 2015, the Director of 
Google’s then Self-Driving Car Project, which became an independent 
 
 
169.  As noted above, on December 13, 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking for the related issue of V2V communications. See supra note 145. And as noted above, in 
September, 2017, the House of Representatives passed a bill to regulate HAV safety, but the Senate 
has yet to act. See supra note 12.  
170.  U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY TRAFFIC ADMIN., Preliminary 
Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles 1 (2013). 
171.  Id. at 3.  
172.  Id. at 5, 8. 
173.  Id. at 7.  
174.  Id. at 10.  
175.  Id. at 10.  
176.  Id. at 12.  
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spin-off company called Waymo in December, 2016, requested an 
interpretation from NHTSA as to whether Google’s Self-Driving System 
(SDS), an “artificial intelligence driver, which is a computer designed into 
the motor vehicle itself that controls all aspects of driving by perceiving 
the environment and responding to it” could be the “driver” for purposes 
of certification of compliance with federal motor vehicle safety 
standards.177 On January 14, 2016, NHTSA issued an Update to its 
Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, 
indicating its plans to release a policy guidance on principles for the safe 
operation of fully automated vehicles, including to propose “best-practice 
guidance” for fully autonomous vehicles.178 This 2016 Update indicated 
that NHTSA would work with the states to develop policies on testing and 
operation of AVs to “offer a nationally consistent approach to autonomous 
vehicles.”179 And on February 4, 2016, NHTSA responded to Google’s 
request, stating that the agency “will consider initiating rulemaking to 
address whether the definition of ‘driver’ in Section 571.3 should be 
updated in response to changing circumstances.”180 NHTSA further 
advised Google to consider petitioning for specific exemptions from 
federal motor vehicle safety standards that required the presence of a 
human driver in the left front seat, because it could not determine whether, 
even assuming that the SDS were the “driver,” Google actually met key 
safety requirements.181 
2. State Regulatory Experimentation 
In the absence of federal motor vehicle safety standards for AVs, a 
number of states have adopted legal rules permitting the testing and 
operation of AVs within their jurisdictions.182 And a dozen states currently 
 
 
177.  Letter from Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Chris Urmson, Director 
of Self-Driving Car Project, Google (Feb. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/77J8-Y49N.  
178.  U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY TRAFFIC ADMIN., DOT/NHTSA 
POLICY STATEMENT CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES, 2016 UPDATE TO “PRELIMINARY 
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES” 1 (2016), http://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
staticfiles/rulemaking/ pdf/Autonomous-Vehicles-Policy-Update-2016.pdf. 
179.  Id. at 1.  
180.  Hemmersbaugh, supra note 177.  
181.  Id.  
182.  For regularly updated information regarding state laws on autonomous vehicles, see 
Stanford University Center for Internet and Society, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory 
Action, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regula 
tory_Action; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 16 (summarizing state rules as of 2016); Rachel Abrams, 
Self-Driving Cars May Get Here Before We’re Ready, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.co m/2016/01/22/business/dealbook/davos-self-driving-cars-may-get-here-before-
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have legislation regarding autonomous vehicles pending.183 These state 
laws exemplify the “laboratories of experimentation” approach to 
lawmaking advocated by Justice Brandeis, as they take different, and 
sometimes conflicting, approaches on important issues such as whether a 
driver must be physically present in the vehicle.184  
 Several states have proposed or adopted laws that would permit 
operation of HAVs without a human driver on public roads. For example, 
on December 9, 2016, Michigan Public Act 332 of 2016 went into 
effect.185 That statute provides that “an automated driving system allowing 
for operation without a human operator shall be considered the driver or 
operator of a vehicle for purposes of determining conformance to any 
applicable traffic or motor vehicle laws and shall be deemed to satisfy 
electronically all physical acts required by a driver or operator of the state 
vehicle.”186 Other states have taken a more circuitous route.187 For 
example, in 2012, the State of California amended its Vehicle Code to 
permit testing of autonomous vehicles on public roads with a human 
operator physically present in the vehicle and ready to take control of the 
vehicle, under certain conditions.188 Two important limiting conditions 
were that the driver had to be an employee, contractor, or designee of the 
vehicle manufacturer, and that the vehicle had to have systems in place to 
 
 
were-ready.html?_r=0; Ariel Wittenberg, States Race to Let Autonomous Cars Drive Alone, 
GREENWIRE (Sept. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/5T4B-ZL37 (reporting on conflicting state approaches 
to presence of a human driver).  
183.  Assemb. B., 399 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017–2018) (pending); S.B. 251, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2017–18) (pending); S.B. 145, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017–18) (pending); Assem. B. 87, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2017–2018) (pending); S.B. 54, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (pending); H.B. 1596, 29th Leg. (Haw. 
2017) (pending); H.B. 2747, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017) (pending); S.B. 1432, 100th Gen. 
Assemb. (Ill. 2017) (pending); S.B. 902 & H.B. 1013, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017) (pending); S.B. 9, 
2017 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017) (pending); S.B. 927 & 928, 2016 Sess. (Mich. 2016) (pending); L.B. 627, 
2017 (Nb. 2017) (pending); A.B. 69, 2017–2018 Sess. (Nev. 2017) (pending); H.B. 314, 2017 Sess. 
(N.H. 2017) (pending); Assemb. B. 554, 2016–2017 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016) (pending); Assemb. B. 
851, 2016–2017 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016) (pending); Assemb. B. 3745, 2016–2017 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 
2016) (pending); S.B. 343, 2016–2017 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016) (pending); Assemb. B. 31, 2015–2016 
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (pending); Assemb. B. 7243, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (pending); 
Assemb. B. 1037, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (pending); H.B. 1394, 2017 Sess. (N.D. 2017) 
(pending); S.B. 202, 2017 Sess. (Ok. 2017) (pending); H.B. 2461, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017) 
(pending); H.B. 1131/S.B. 1072, 2017 Sess. (Tenn. 2017) (pending); H.B. 0705/S.B. 0513, 2017 Sess. 
(Tenn. 2017) (pending); H.B. 257, 2017 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017) (pending); H.B. 1372, 2016 Sess. (Va. 
2016) (pending).  
184.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
185.  Public Act 332 of 2016, amending Mich. Veh. Code § 257.665 (permitting operation by 
a vehicle without a human driver on public roads within the state).  
186.  Id. 
187.  S.B. 1298, 2011–2012 Sess. § 2(b) (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750); 
FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (noting that driver need not be physically present in the vehicle).  
188.  Id.  
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alert the driver about system failure.189 Notably, however, the 2012 law 
anticipated the possibilities that a human operator would not be physically 
present in the vehicle,190 and that a vehicle could be operated even without 
a remote human driver.191 While these rules could intrude into federal 
authority to regulate vehicle safety (especially requirements for vehicle 
equipment design like alert systems), the 2012 California law expressly 
recognized that federal regulations “shall supersede” state law if they 
conflict.192 While the 2012 statutory language contemplated the possibility 
of fully driverless cars, the California Department of Motor Vehicles 
adopted regulations in 2014 that only authorized the testing of AVs with a 
human driver present in the vehicle, in keeping with the then-state of 
technology.193  
In 2016, two developments occurred to change this landscape. First, in 
2016, California amended the state vehicle code, authorizing a single local 
transportation authority to pilot test HAVs without a human driver in the 
vehicle, including HAVs lacking a steering wheel, brake pedal, and 
accelerator. 194 The pilot testing of driverless HAVs has been limited to 
two specified locations (one of which includes some public roads), and 
only permits operation of such HAVs at speeds of less than 35 mph.195 The 
California Legislature made clear that the amendment was “only intended 
to govern the establishment of one local pilot project,” and not to amend 
state AV policy more broadly.196 In September, 2016, however, the 
California DMV published a draft of proposed regulations that would 
permit the testing by manufacturers and deployment on public roads 
within the state of autonomous vehicles without drivers.197 And in March, 
 
 
189.  Id. at § 2.  
190.  If a manufacturer seeks approval to test AVs without a human operator in the vehicle, 
the Department may impose additional safety requirements Id. at § 2(e). 
191.  California law expressly defines an “autonomous vehicle” as a vehicle with 
“autonomous technology,” meaning, “technology that has the capability to drive a vehicle without the 
active physical control or monitoring by a human operator.” Id. at §§ 2(a)(2)(A), 2(a)(1). 
192.  Id. at §2(g). 
193.  Order to Adopt, Title 13, Division 1, Chapter 1, Article 3.7. California DMV (May 19, 
2014), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/d48f347b-8815-458e-9df2-5ded9f208e9e/adop 
ted_t xt.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=d48f347b-8815-458e-9df2-
5ded9f208e9e.  
194.  Assemb. B. 1592, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 38755).  
195.  Id. at § (a)(1), 1(a)(2). The manufacturer must also certify that the pilot project 
“complies, or will comply” with NHTSA “guidance, if any, on the safe testing, deployment, and 
operation of autonomous vehicles.” Id. at § 1(c)(2)(D).  
196.  Id. at § 1(g).  
197.  Draft Express Terms, Title 13, Division 1, Chapter 1, Articles 3.7 & 3.8. California 
DMV (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/211897ae-c58a-4f28-a2b7-
03cbe213e51d/av expressterms_93016.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
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2017, the California DMV issued proposed regulations for public 
comment with the same goal in mind—to regulate the testing and 
deployment on public roads of vehicles without a human driver.198 The 
comment period closed in April 2017; however, as of the date this Article 
went to press, no final regulatory rules have been published.199 
In 2012, Florida initially adopted legislation requiring the operator of 
an AV to be physically present in the vehicle.200 In 2016, however, the 
Florida legislature deleted the requirement that the operator be physically 
present.201 This opened the possibility of remote operation of vehicles.202 
However, it could likewise include fully driverless cars without even 
remote operators.203 
In contrast, other jurisdictions, including Nevada, Tennessee, and the 
District of Columbia, have adopted legal rules permitting the operation of 
AVs, but requiring a human driver to be present in the vehicle. 
Specifically, by legislation adopted in 2013, Nevada authorizes AVs, but 
requires a human operator to be seated in the vehicle and able to take 
immediate control.204 In 2016, Tennessee adopted legislation authorizing 
the testing of AVs on public roads.205 The Act distinguishes “No-operator-
required autonomous vehicle[s]” (NORAVs), from “Operator-required 
autonomous vehicle[s]” (ORAVs), and permits manufacturers to test 
ORAVs on public roads if certified by the State.206 The law calls for the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to promulgate rules to govern the safe 
 
 
198.  Draft Express Terms, Title 13, Division 1, Chapter 1, Articles 3.7 & 3.8. California 
DMV (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/caa2f466-fe0f-454a-a461-
f5d7a079de49/av expressterms_31017.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. For further discussion of the potential 
conflict that could arise between California’s proposed regulations and NHTSA’s 2016 Policy, see 
infra Part III.  
199.  Deployment of Autonomous Vehicles for Public Operation, CAL. DEP’T MOTOR 
VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/auto.  
200.  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1); H.B. 1207, 2012 Leg. § 3 (Fla. 2012). Other requirements are 
similar to California’s, including that federal law “shall supersede” state law in cases of conflict. H.B. 
1207 at § 4 BB 4.1; FLA. STAT. § 319.145(1)(d)(2).  
201.  H.B. 7027, 2016 Leg. Ch. 2016–181 (Fla. 2016) (deleting the requirement that a human 
operator be present in the vehicle during autonomous mode). 
202.  FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (“[A] person shall be deemed to be the operator of an autonomous 
vehicle operating in autonomous mode when the person causes the vehicle’s autonomous technology 
to engage, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the vehicle while the vehicle is 
operating in autonomous mode.”). 
203.  Id.  
204.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.070 (2013). The Nevada statute directs the Department of 
Motor Vehicles to establish a special driver’s license “endorsement” for any operator of an AV within 
the state. Id. at § 482A.060; 482A.200 (2011). 
205.  S.B. 1561, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2016); H.B. 1564, 109th Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016) 
(codified in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47, 54, 55, 67 (2016)). 
206.  S.B. 1561, 109th Gen. Assemb. §§ 2, 3 (Tenn. 2016), (effective Jan. 1, 2017).  
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testing of NORAVs in the state.207 And in 2013, the District of Columbia 
adopted legislation authorizing the operation of AVs on public roads 
within the District, as long as a human driver is seated in the vehicle and 
prepared to assume control.208  
In 2015, by Executive Order, the State of Arizona adopted an 
intermediate position, authorizing the creation of pilot testing programs on 
certain university campuses in cooperation with AV manufacturers.209 
Arizona requires a licensed, human operator to monitor and be able to take 
control of the vehicle if necessary. 210 The operator must be an employee, 
contractor, or other designee of the entity developing the technology to 
operate the vehicle.211 However, the human operator need not be 
physically present in the vehicle, and instead may be at a remote 
location.212 Finally, both North Dakota and Utah have adopted legislation 
requiring studies of AVs, and assessing what laws might require adoption 
or amendment to address AVs in the state,213 and Louisiana has defined 
“autonomous technology” for purposes of its Highway Regulatory Act.214 
Local governments have likewise adopted rules governing AVs, often 
to encourage partnerships with industry or academia to test such vehicles. 
Pittsburgh, home to Carnegie Mellon University, for example, has taken a 
leadership position in the development and testing of AVs.215 As a result, 
in 2016, Uber began testing AVs in the city as part of its services, though a 
human driver sat in the driver’s seat to monitor the vehicles to ensure 
safety, and the experiment has not been without friction.216 In Las Vegas, 
the City Council adopted a resolution in 2016 creating an “innovation 
district” that permits local officials to craft rules to permit testing of 
 
 
207.  Id. § 9 (effective Jan. 1, 2017). Tennessee preempts local governments from banning 
AVs within their jurisdictions. S.B. 598, 109th Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). 
208.  D.C. CODE § 50–2352 (2013). 
209.  Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2015-09 (Aug. 25, 2015) https://azgovernor.gov/file/2660/ 
download?to ken=nLkPLRi1.  
210.  Id.  
211.  Id.  
212.  Id.  
213.  H.B. 1065, 64th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2015) (requiring a legislative management study); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-102 (West 2016).  
214.  H.B. 1143, 2016 Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (enacting LA REV. STAT. § 32:1, § 1.2 (2016)). 
215.  Cecilia Kang, No Driver? Bring it On. How Pittsburgh Became Uber’s Testing Ground, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/M9PG-2DCM.  
216.  Id.; Cecilia Kang, Pittsburgh Welcomed Uber’s Driverless Car Experiment. Not 
Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/CP67-LKG3.  Uber attempted to expand its 
driverless vehicle program in San Francisco, but withdrew after the California DMV took the position 
that this program was illegal and revoked the cars’ registrations. Christopher Mele, In a Retreat, Uber 
Ends its Self-Driving Car Experiment in San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/UG6Z-DYZT. 
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AVs.217 Other cities, including Ann Arbor, Michigan, Somerville, 
Massachusetts, and Johnson County, Iowa are partnering with universities 
and private firms to test AVs.218 And Waymo is testing its driverless cars 
in Mountain View, California; Austin, Texas; Kirkland, Washington; and 
Metro Phoenix, Arizona.219 
E. 2016: Advisory Nonpreemption 
In September 2016, NHTSA issued the Federal Automated Vehicles 
Policy: Accelerating the Next Revolution in Roadway Safety (2016 
NHTSA Policy or Policy).220 The agency is clear about the Policy’s 
interim, informal status: “[A]s this area evolves, the “unknowns” of today 
will become “knowns” tomorrow. We do not intend to write the final word 
on highly automated vehicles here. Rather, we intend to establish a 
foundation and a framework upon which future Agency action will 
occur.”221 The agency invites comments on its Policy, and indicates that it 
will revisit the Policy within one year.222 The 2016 NHTSA Policy notes 
that safety is the agency’s top priority.223  
Yet, while making clear that the Policy is an interim one, NHTSA 
nonetheless takes a stand on the proper spheres of federal and state 
authority: 
As motor vehicle equipment increasingly performs “driving” tasks, 
[the federal Department of Transportation’s] exercise of its 
authority and responsibility to regulate the safety of such equipment 
will increasingly encompass state tasks similar to “licensing” of the 
non-human “driver” (e.g., hardware and software performing part or 
 
 
217.  Adam Candee, The Car of the Future is Already on the Road in Nevada, LAS VEGAS 
SUN (Jan. 30, 2017 2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/jan/30/autonomous-driverless-
vehicle-future-nevada/; Ben Miller, Las Vegas to Launch “Innovation District” Geared Toward High-
Tech Transportation Testing, FUTURE STRUCTURE (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/fs/Las-
Vegas-to-Launch-Innovation-District-Geared-Toward-High-Tech-Transportation-Testing.html.  
218.  Jordan Graham & Brian Dowling, Massachusetts Seeks to Become Autonomous Vehicle 
Research, Testing Hub, FUTURESTRUCTURE (Jan. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/4NLF-J3VN (discussing 
local initiatives); Press Release, Boston Mayor’s Office, Mayor Walsh Announces Autonomous 
Vehicle Initiative, (Sept. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/BXF9-XJKE (discussing Boston initiatives); 
Allana Akhtar, The City That Runs Itself: Mcity and the Future of Automated Transportation, MICH. 
DAILY (Mar. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/YJY3-HQUU (discussing development of MCity in Ann 
Arbor as the first testing ground for AVs in the world); Josh Leary & Marco Santana, Iowa County 
Says Yes to Driverless Cars, USA TODAY (July 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/E3SE-XUYX. 
219. Waymo, On the Road, https://waymo.com/ontheroad/. 
220.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24.  
221.  Id. at 3.  
222.  Id.  
223.  Id. at 5. 
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all of the driving task).224 
In that vein, the Policy states explicitly that hardware and software are part 
of the vehicle, and thus subject to federal motor vehicle safety 
standards.225 But the Policy does not expressly preempt state law—nor can 
it, given its informal nature—to date, NHTSA has not actually issued any 
federal motor vehicle safety standards that would have this preemptive 
effect. Instead, the language is conditional, noting that the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act contains express preemption language, and that “If NHTSA 
issued [a federal motor vehicle safety standard] setting performance 
requirements for HAVs, then a State could not have its own performance 
standards on the same aspects of HAV performance unless they were 
identical to NHTSA’s standards.”226 
With respect to what states should do, the wording is advisory: 
[The Department of Transportation] strongly encourages States to 
allow DOT alone to regulate the performance of HAV technology 
and vehicles. If a State does pursue HAV performance-related 
regulations, that State should consult with NHTSA and base its 
efforts on the Vehicle Performance Guidance provided in this 
Policy.227 
The Policy thus encourages federal-state consultation, and encourages 
the states to adopt a Model State Policy (upon which the agency likewise 
seeks comment) to avoid inconsistent or conflicting rules.228 NHTSA 
appears to acknowledge that states may experiment with different 
approaches, explaining that it does not intend for state policies to achieve 
“uniformity or identical laws and regulations across all States. Rather, the 
aim should be sufficient consistency of laws and policies to avoid a 
patchwork of inconsistent State laws that could impede innovation and 
widespread distribution of safety enhancing automated vehicle 
 
 
224.  Id. at 38. 
225.  Id. at 38. 
226.  Id. at 38. (emphasis added). The 2016 NHTSA Policy neither asserts nor disclaims 
preemptive intent with respect to state tort law, noting only that “[t]he Supreme Court has also found 
that State laws may be preempted if they stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
a NHTSA safety standard.” Id. It does not contain boilerplate language used after 2012 in the 
rulemakings cited supra, which asserts that states may exceed safety standards that prescribe only a 
minimum, and that “many NHTSA rules” prescribe “only a minimum safety standard.” 81 Fed. Reg. 
6454–58 (February 8, 2016). For a discussion of NHTSA boilerplate, see supra note 27.  
227.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24, at 37 (emphases added).  
228.  Id. at 37 (“The Model State Policy . . . can help to avoid a patchwork of inconsistent 
laws and regulations among the 50 States and other U.S. jurisdictions, which could delay the 
widespread deployment of these potentially lifesaving technologies.”).  
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technologies.”229 The Policy then confirms that the federal and state 
governments will operate in different spheres. Federal authority will 
include setting federal standards for new motor vehicles and equipment, 
enforcing compliance with those standards, managing recalls, and issuing 
“guidance for vehicle and equipment manufacturers to follow” including 
performance guidelines for HAVs. State authority will cover licensing of 
“human” drivers, motor vehicle registration, adopting and enforcing traffic 
laws, conducting vehicle safety inspections, and regulating insurance and 
tort liability.230 
This Policy is not an enforceable command; indeed, in the absence of 
federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to HAVs, it is not clear 
what federal standards would be enforced.231 And it remains to be seen 
whether the states will continue to adopt their own rules or will instead 
begin to adopt more uniform standards.232 But this advisory guidance is a 
way of not only signaling where the agency intends to go in the future, but 
of preserving flexibility in the allocation of regulatory authority now 
between the federal government and the states in times of uncertainty.  
NHTSA’s 2016 Policy will not be the final word on HAV safety 
regulation. Indeed, it has not even been the final word to date.233 The next 
Part addresses one potential critique of advisory nonpreemption—the 
potential for regulatory conflict—and examines the degree of deference 
that courts would likely give to advisory nonpreemption if challenged. The 
final Part addresses a second potential critique, relating to democratic 
legitimacy in light of the method’s informal nature. It concludes with the 
Article’s major normative claim that advisory nonpreemption can balance 
the need for precaution under conditions of uncertainty relating to 
innovation, while simultaneously promoting innovation and democratic 
legitimacy in time. These important benefits outweigh the costs in 
temporary regulatory uncertainty and the potential for conflict between the 
federal government and the states.  
 
 
 
 
229.  Id. at 39.  
230.  Id. at 38–39 (citing Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401–412 (2012), et seq., which 
charges the States with reducing traffic crashes through safety programs, traffic regulations, vehicle 
inspection and registration, licensing, and driver education, among other means).  
231.  See infra, Part III (discussing degree of judicial deference owed to the Policy). 
232.  One state has already given notice that it plans a more binding approach. See infra, Part 
III (discussing California’s regulatory proposal to make AV safety standards mandatory).  
233.  See infra, Part III (discussing California’s proposed HAV regulations); supra note 12 
(noting House bill proposing to regulate HAV design and safety). 
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III. ADVISORY NONPREEMPTION AND THE COURTS 
Advisory nonpreemption is a useful tool that federal agencies can use 
to modify an existing allocation of authority and to promote innovation 
and precaution in times of innovation uncertainty. But flexibility has costs. 
This Part first acknowledges one limitation of this approach—the potential 
for conflict between federal and state policies—and examines how courts 
might interpret advisory nonpreemption in the context of such a conflict.  
A. Potential Conflict  
One concern about advisory nonpreemption is that concurrent authority 
can lead to regulatory uncertainty and potential for conflicts between the 
federal policy and state law rules in the short term. States may decline the 
federal advice to adopt a model approach and instead adopt their own 
rules. This lack of regulatory uniformity can increase costs to industry by 
reducing economies of scale, and requiring firms to comply with multiple 
rules.234  
One such conflict may arise between NHTSA and the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles (CDMV) regarding how to regulate AV 
safety.235 Just two weeks after NHTSA released its 2016 Policy, the state 
agency released draft proposed regulations that could create a conflict with 
parts of the NHTSA guidance.236 And in March, 2017, the California 
 
 
234.  There are other potential concerns arising out of concurrent jurisdiction, including the 
possibility of unintended “leakage” from states with stricter standards to states with more lax standards 
if a vehicle authorized for testing or deployment in one state crossed state lines into another state that 
did not permit such vehicles on public roads. In a different context, one recent economic study has 
demonstrated the significant potential for leakage as a result of concurrent jurisdiction over emissions 
limits for new vehicles. Lawrence H. Goulder, Mark R. Jacobsen & Arthur Van Benthem, Unintended 
Consequences from Nested State and Federal Regulations: The Case of the Pavley Greenhouse-Gas-
per-Mile Limits, 63 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 187 (2012). Whether such leakage will occur in cases 
of concurrent/dynamic jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the legal regimes themselves, and the 
way that federal and state standards interact. In the vehicle emissions context, vehicle manufacturers 
were governed by a federal average standard, such that meeting a higher standard in certain states 
permitted manufacturers to reduce their environmental performance in other states while still meeting 
the federal average standard.  
235.  Ariel Wittenberg & Anne Mulkern, Autonomous Cars: Calif., DOT in Turf War over 
Robocar Regulation, E&E NEWS (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060046097. 
236.  Deployment of Autonomous Vehicles for Public Operation, CAL. DEP’T MOTOR 
VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/auto. There are different degrees 
of conflict between federal and state laws. In one case, it is impossible to comply with both sets of 
rules; in the other, it is possible to comply with both rules if the target complies with the more 
stringent rule. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) 
(discussing how federal law trumps state law in the former context). California’s proposed rule would 
raise the latter concern.  
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DMV issued proposed regulations for public comment.237 Where NHTSA 
merely recommends that automakers should submit a safety assessment 
letter to the agency (addressing concerns like vehicle cybersecurity, 
system safety, and operational design),238 California’s proposed 
regulations would require automakers to submit the safety assessment 
letter to its Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in order to obtain a state 
testing permit.239 California’s proposed regulations would also require 
automakers to notify (but not to obtain approval from) each locality in 
which they wish to operate.240 
Some automakers criticized California’s draft proposed regulations for 
“effectively codifying NHTSA’s optional . . . safety assessment”241—a 
critique that likewise applies to the March 10, 2017 proposed regulations. 
They argued that the shift from an optional safety assessment to a 
mandatory one would be too onerous, and directly contradicts the 
voluntary nature of the NHTSA Policy.242 Additionally, many in the 
industry assert that “an autonomous vehicle policy should be national in 
scope, allowing manufacturers to build vehicles that can be tested and sold 
in all 50 states.”243 If California’s proposed regulations become law, 
automakers complain that they would have to abide by a patchwork of 
regulations that hinders innovation.244 On the other hand, Jean Shiomoto, 
the Director of the California DMV, has argued that automakers have 
already been testing AVs in California for years, and that the state should 
not have to wait for NHTSA to issue mandatory safety regulations. 245 In 
the state agency’s view, California must act now in order to protect the 
safety of its citizens. 
This potential conflict between California’s and NHTSA’s approaches 
highlights the challenges that can arise in instances of advisory 
nonpreemption. But this limitation is not insurmountable. It merely 
 
 
237.  Draft Express Terms, Title 13, Division 1, Chapter 1, Articles 3.7 & 3.8, California 
DMV (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/caa2f466-fe0f-454a-a461-
f5d7a079de49/av expressterms_31017.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.  
238.  2016 NHTSA Policy, supra note 24, at 15. 
239.  Cal. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 227.38(g), 228.06(d) (proposed Mar. 10, 2017). 
240.  Id. § 227.38(a) (proposed Mar. 10, 2017). The draft proposed regulations would have 
required manufacturers to obtain permission from the local governments, but provision was removed 
from the proposed regulations.  
241.  Wittenberg & Mulkern, supra note 235. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Id. (citing Paul Scullion, Global Automakers Safety Manager). 
244.  A second concern that is always in the background when agencies are acting, is the 
potential that Congress will adopt new legislation that overtakes agency action. As the one-year time 
period for reviewing the 2016 NHTSA Policy approached, on July 27, 2017, the Self-Drive Act was 
introduced in the House. See supra note 12.  
245.  Id. 
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highlights the importance of ongoing dialogue between the federal 
government and the states, and the need to include industry voices in that 
conversation as well. In the words of one scholar, allowing multiple voices 
to speak in a regulatory space, can promote an “iterative” process of 
regulatory improvement.246 Just as California is proposing concrete steps 
to lead in the area of AV safety, California has taken such steps in the past 
in a different context—the regulation of vehicle tailpipe emissions.247 The 
federal government and California have engaged in an iterative process, 
together and apart over time, to improve and refine standards for vehicle 
tailpipe emissions.248 And while this iterative process played out in the 
context of a dynamic regime under the Clean Air Act, in which California 
was singled out for special treatment ex ante to participate in the setting of 
tailpipe standards, the existing regime for motor vehicle safety does not 
currently incorporate that dynamism.  
Advisory nonpreemption, however, renders the dual regime temporarily 
dynamic, permitting the state to engage in the same kind of process with 
the federal government here. This iterative process can improve the safety 
standards as a substantive matter, and can help determine whether state or 
federal regulation—or some form of concurrent jurisdiction—would be 
best in the long run. Indeed, in 2015, the head of NHTSA wrote a 
memorandum to California DMV Director Shiomoto to update her on the 
agency’s progress with AV regulations while her agency was 
simultaneously working on California’s AV rules.249 In that memorandum, 
NHTSA stated that its mission is to “prevent crashes and save lives on 
America’s roads,” and that it was “eager to work with [her] and officials in 
other states to support the development of [AVs].”250 If the states and 
federal government are willing to work together, advisory nonpreemption 
can help to move the regulatory process forward from a temporarily 
flexible regime to some entirely new allocation of authority. And while 
 
 
246.  Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1100 (2009) (observing the benefits of repeat interaction between the federal and California 
governments on motor vehicle tailpipe emissions standards). 
247.  That process involved three potentially conflicting sets of standards for new motor 
vehicles: emissions standards under the Clean Air Act set by the EPA, emissions standards under 
California law set by California, and fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act set by the Department of Transportation. Jody Freeman, The Obama 
Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 
(2011) (discussing the interagency rulemaking process).  
248.  Id.  
249.  Memorandum from the Nat’l Highway Safety Traffic Admin. to Jean M. Shiomoto, 
Director, Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (June 2, 2015) (on file with author). 
250.  Id. 
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one option is to return to a dual federalism regime in which the federal 
government adopts the “best” (however defined) safety standards, 
informed by discussions with state officials, there are alternatives. One 
alternative allocation to consider is one with concurrent, dynamic 
jurisdiction similar to the regime that exists for tailpipe emissions, in 
which one state like California, or coalition of states working together, can 
adopt either “more protective” rules if such rules can be assessed along a 
linear continuum, or simply alternative rules about driverlessness, after 
obtaining a waiver from NHTSA. Other states could then adopt those 
rules, creating a two-tier, but not multi-tier, system.  
Moreover, at least one commentator has noted that even industry 
groups may prefer flexibility, if there is a risk that a federal regulation will 
get the substance of a regulation wrong.251 For example, in its 2013 
Preliminary Guidance on Autonomous Vehicles, NHTSA stated that the 
states should adopt rules to ensure that a human driver would be present in 
the vehicle.252 It made this recommendation on the basis that driverless 
vehicles had not yet been tested. However, only two years later, Google 
sought guidance from the agency as to whether a “vehicle” could ever be 
considered a “driver” given its efforts to promote driverless cars that 
actually lacked a steering wheel. Had NHTSA made the human driver rule 
mandatory and prohibited state experimentation, it would likely have 
stifled this innovation. Greater stability in the balance of power may 
provide regulatory certainty for markets, but may be less able to keep up 
with the unpredictable nature of innovation.253 This Article advocates 
advisory nonpreemption as occupying a temporary middle ground. 
B. Role for Courts 
While conflicts between the federal government and the states can 
often be resolved through negotiations and consultation, there remains the 
possibility that an aggrieved party could initiate a legal challenge either to 
the federal agency’s action of advisory nonpreemption, or to the state law 
that poses a potential conflict. For example, an auto manufacturer, 
 
 
251.  Wu, supra note 34, at 1843 (noting that APA procedures are meant to protect not only 
the public, but industry, and that industry bears the costs of a slow rulemaking process).  
252.  NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY TRAFFIC ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF CONCERNING 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES (2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehi 
cles_Policy.pdf. 
253.  Even skeptics of flexible regulatory regimes acknowledge that flexibility’s benefits can, 
under certain circumstances, outweigh its costs. Super, supra note 21, at 1382 (arguing that flexibility 
may be warranted when “the benefits of new information or other important resources exceed the costs 
of decreases in the availability of other inputs required for a decision and in the value of the decision 
rendered”).  
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preferring the more flexible approach advocated by the federal agency, 
might bring a legal challenge to the state rule. This type of challenge 
would raise the question of whether advisory nonpreemption actually 
preempts state law, as well as subsidiary questions about whether advisory 
nonpreemption is a final agency action, whether such a challenge is ripe, 
and what degree of deference the courts owe to such a statement about the 
agency’s interpretation of the words “vehicle” and “motor vehicle 
equipment” in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. A safety advocate or citizen 
of the state with the potentially conflicting rule could also challenge the 
federal agency’s advisory nonpreemption statement directly as being 
“arbitrary and capricious” under the APA, raising similar questions of 
justiciability and deference.254  
At the same time, to the extent that the agency’s advisory 
nonpreemption statement is not merely interpreting substantive statutory 
text (the terms “vehicle” and “vehicle equipment”), but also addressing the 
balance of power between the federal government and the states, the 
specific question of what deference is owed to an agency’s determination 
about the preemptive effect of its actions could raise additional 
concerns.255 This section examines how courts might address these issues 
in the face of such a challenge, using the 2016 NHTSA Policy to explore 
these issues. It concludes that a court would be unlikely to find state law 
preempted as a result of the 2016 NHTSA Policy for two reasons. First, 
the agency itself does not appear to claim that the Policy has preemptive 
effect; it claims only that the issuance of a federal motor vehicle safety 
standard would preempt state law. However, this triggering condition has 
not yet occurred. Second, a policy guidance document is entitled to 
deference according to its persuasiveness. As the expert agency charged 
with enforcing the statute, NHTSA’s reading of the terms “vehicle” and 
“vehicle equipment” in the statute is certainly reasonable.256 However, as 
 
 
254.  Cf. Strauss, supra note 103, at 817–837 (discussing justiciability concerns for 
“publication rules” including finality and ripeness, as well as the degree of deference owed).  
255.  Sharkey, supra note 27; Mendelson, supra note 40; Metzger, supra note 40.  
256.  Before undertaking an examination of the deference questions, a brief note on finality is 
warranted. Before any agency action can be challenged in the courts, that action must be “a final 
agency action” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). Because policy guidance documents may be 
amended as circumstances change—indeed, this flexibility is one of their most important attributes—a 
question arises as to whether such an interpretive document constitutes such “final agency action.” If, 
in the circumstances described above, NHTSA were to order California to stand down with its rules 
and make the claim that its policy preempted the state regulation—effectively applying the policy in a 
concrete case—this concrete application would constitute a final agency action to challenge in court, 
and the challenge would be ripe for review. Because of the tentative and conditional nature of the 
agency’s statements in the 2016 NHTSA Policy, it is unlikely that a party would seek “pre-
enforcement review.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. 
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noted above, this is not the only possible interpretation.  
If a court were to find any justiciability hurdles surmounted, it would 
ultimately confront the question that is the “hot topic” in administrative 
law—what deference is owed to the agency’s interpretation? Judicial 
deference to agency actions is not a binary issue.257 Courts neither blindly 
obey the agency interpretation nor reject it entirely. Instead, there are three 
degrees of deference to agency action: Chevron deference, in which a 
court must defer to an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute that is 
reasonable;258 Skidmore deference, in which a court views the agency 
interpretation as having precedential, persuasive influence or “weight;”259 
and no deference at all.  
In such analysis, one must of course begin with the text of the statute, 
which expressly delegates to NHTSA the authority to issue federal motor 
vehicle safety standards to reduce traffic accidents and deaths.260 The 
statute defines “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle driven or drawn by 
mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, 
roads, and highways,” and “motor vehicle equipment” as: 
(A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally 
manufactured; 
(B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for 
replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as 
an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle.261 
The ultimate legal question is whether these terms include hardware and 
software in HAVs. But the question of deference comes first.  
Chevron requires courts to undertake their deference analysis in two 
famous “steps:” first, to determine whether the statutory text is clear 
regarding the precise question at issue, and second, if the text is 
ambiguous, to determine whether the agency’s interpretation is 
 
 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Strauss, supra note 103, at 818–22 (discussing finality and ripeness). It is 
further unlikely that a court would find the matter “ripe” prior to enforcement, given that Congress set 
the trigger for preemption as the issuance of a federal motor vehicle safety standard, a trigger that has 
not yet occurred.  
257.  Strauss, supra note 103, at 811 (discussing Chevron, Skidmore and no-deference 
alternatives).  
258.  Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
259.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); United States v. Mead Corp., 33 U.S. 
218 (2001); Strauss, supra note 103, at 811 (referring to Skidmore deference as Skidmore “weight”). 
260.  49 U.S.C. §§ 30101, 30111 (2012) (“The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe 
motor vehicle safety standards” that are objective and practicable, and meet the need for vehicle 
safety).  
261.  Id. §§ 30102(7), 30107(8).  
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“permissible” or reasonable under the law.262 However, there is an 
antecedent question that precedes such analysis. Cass Sunstein identified 
this as Chevron “Step Zero,” in which the court must make an initial 
determination of “whether the Chevron framework applies at all,”263 or 
whether instead, some lesser form of deference under Skidmore is 
warranted. Under this analysis, Chevron deference is warranted when 
Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to the agency, and the 
agency action has “the force of law”—namely, that it was adopted 
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking or “by some other indication 
of comparable congressional intent.”264 Other forms of agency action, 
including policy guidance documents, interpretive statements, letters, and 
other “publication rules,” warrant lesser deference under Skidmore, 
namely the weight of their persuasive power.265  
 Complicating this Step Zero analysis is the “major questions” doctrine 
in which the Supreme Court has rejected agency attempts to remake 
statutory schemes wholesale. Sunstein has identified this doctrine as 
raising an additional Step Zero issue, in which courts have indicated their 
willingness to reduce deference—even to no deference at all—“if a 
fundamental issue is involved, one that goes to the heart of the regulatory 
scheme at issue.”266 Lisa Heinzerling has referred to these canons of 
statutory construction as the “power” canons, because they go to the 
degree of power that agencies have vis-a-vis Congress to address those 
issues that are of economic and political significance, including when 
agencies assert regulatory authority in new areas or attempt major changes 
to statute schemes.267  
 
 
262.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
263.  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). Sunstein cites, among 
others, United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 
(2000); and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), as “Step Zero” decisions. In Sunstein’s view, 
under some circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether Chevron applies, and he advocates greater use 
of Chevron deference to agencies when the agency has “authoritatively answered a question about the 
meaning of a statute that it has been asked to implement.” Id. at 192.  
264.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.  
265.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40; Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore and noting that 
deference “has been understood to vary with circumstances,” and that courts look to the “degree of the 
agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the 
agency’s position”). 
266.  Sunstein, supra note 262, at 193. 
267.  Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court has limited deference to agencies on issues of economic and political 
significance). Heinzerling cites as examples Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2444 (2014) (addressing the EPA’s application of the Clean Air Act to climate change); King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (addressing matters at the heart of the Affordable Care Act); 
and Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707–08 (2015) (holding that the EPA went beyond the bounds 
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Taking these two aspects of the Step Zero inquiry into account, it is 
easy to see that the 2016 NHTSA Policy, with its interpretation of the 
terms “vehicle” and “vehicle equipment,” would warrant only Skidmore, 
rather than Chevron deference. This conclusion would not be particularly 
controversial, as it is merely a publication rule, and was not adopted 
pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures.268 The more complex 
question is whether the major questions doctrine would limit any 
deference a court might owe to the agency’s interpretation at all. On the 
one hand, the question of what constitutes a “vehicle” or “vehicle 
equipment” quite clearly goes to the heart of the statute, and thus, could 
easily be read to implicate the major questions doctrine. And it is likewise 
clear that Congress did not anticipate the rise of HAVs when it used the 
term “vehicle.” On the other hand, NHTSA could argue that the major 
questions doctrine should not apply here, because its interpretation of 
“vehicle” and “vehicle equipment” would not be “disastrously 
unworkable,” “result in . . . a dramatic expansion of agency authority,” or 
“extend[] [agency] jurisdiction over millions of previously unregulated 
entities.”269 The latter reading is likely more plausible. 
If a court held that the major questions doctrine did not preclude 
deference to the agency’s interpretation, a court would likely find the 
interpretation persuasive under Skidmore. After all, NHTSA is the agency 
with expertise, charged with overseeing vehicle safety. And HAVs—
though they do not routinely yet—may soon travel in interstate commerce, 
implicating safety concerns that the states may not be able to address with 
separate rules. Moreover, while it would be possible to interpret the terms 
“vehicle” and “vehicle equipment” to incorporate only the hardware, and 
not the software (in other words, to interpret the software as a “driver” that 
would be subject to state control), NHTSA’s reading is certainly 
reasonable.  
But what of NHTSA’s statements on preemption? The statute states 
clearly that what preempts state law is “[w]hen a motor vehicle safety 
standard is in effect.”270 The 2016 NHTSA Policy appears to acknowledge 
 
 
of its authority to ignore costs in regulating existing power plants).  
268.  Cf. Strauss, supra note 103, at 811–12 (concluding that publication rules are entitled to 
“precedential” Skidmore weight, relying on the text of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) for the analogy to 
precedent). 
269.  Cf. Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions about the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 493–94 (2016) (noting that Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court 
concluded that the major questions doctrine did not apply to EPA’s interpretation that sources already 
subject to permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act could be required to install additional 
pollution-reduction devices).  
270.  49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2012). 
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this absence in its use of conditional language: “If NHTSA issued” such a 
standard for HAVs, “then a State could” only adopt identical legislative or 
regulatory performance standards.271 The agency therefore does not 
actually preempt any state law and instead merely advises the states 
(“strongly encourages”) to cede this territory to the federal agency.272 This 
2016 Policy therefore lacks any actual preemptive effect. In this way, the 
situation resembles that of Grocery Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell, 
in which industry trade organizations challenged a Vermont law requiring 
mandatory labeling of food containing genetically engineered 
organisms.273 The plaintiffs contended that the Vermont mandatory 
labeling law was expressly preempted under the terms of several federal 
statutes that prohibit states from imposing food labeling standards that are 
“not identical” to federal labeling laws.274 The court held that the industry 
plaintiffs could not establish express preemption based on the “not 
identical” language because there was in fact no federal labeling 
requirement in place.275  
Advisory nonpreemption therefore does not implicate the kinds of 
concerns raised by some scholars who argue that agencies have claimed 
too much federal authority without congressional authorization, and that 
courts ought not to defer to such decisions.276 Advisory nonpreemption has 
the opposite effect—it does not actually preempt state action—and thus 
preserves a role for the states, at least temporarily, in the face of 
innovation uncertainty. This deference analysis can serve as a guide to 
other federal agencies going forward if they decide to use advisory 
nonpreemption. These legal questions are deeply case-specific. But if an 
agency seeks to use its interpretive authority to announce its current views 
on regulatory balance, while retaining flexibility to change those views in 
the future, and permitting state experimentation to continue, advisory 
nonpreemption can serve these ends effectively in other contexts as well.  
 
 
271.  2016 NHTSA POLICY, supra note 24, at 38 (emphasis added). 
272.  Id. at 37.  
273.  102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015). Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, States Versus FDA, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609 (2015) (discussing Sorrell and arguing that courts should defer to the views 
of the agency to resolve preemption challenges, even views expressed in informal guidance 
documents, if the agency has considered relevant state interests in the regulatory process).  
274.  Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 611–14 (discussing the preemptive effect of the federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012), combined with the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343-1(a)(1)–(5) (2012), which expressly preempt state food labeling 
requirements that are “not identical” to mandatory labeling requirements under the FDCA).  
275.  Id. at 612 (“Plaintiffs acknowledge that the FDA has promulgated no formal standards 
for GE labeling.”); Id. at 614 (“[T]he absence of a federal standard obviates any claim that a state 
requirement is ‘not identical’ to it”). 
276.  Mendelson, supra note 40.  
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IV. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
Advisory nonpreemption poses a second risk—that it may outlast its 
temporary nature.277 One scholar writing about temporary substantive rules 
in the form of agency “threats,” offered an example of how the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) informal response to computerized 
medical devices became “stale and counterproductive” because the agency 
never followed up on its threats with more formal enforcement, and 
because informal action essentially replaced notice-and-comment 
rulemaking for twenty-five years.278 While there is always a risk that 
advisory nonpreemption will outlast its usefulness, the same is arguably 
true for any regulation, including formal rules, which are much harder to 
amend when circumstances change. And in the federalism context, this 
concern may prove less salient than for temporary substantive rules, 
largely because advisory nonpreemption allows the states to proceed with 
their own rules. If the states do so, as California has proposed in this case, 
then state action can provoke additional federal action. Conflict requires 
resolution, or at a least more iterative dialogue. In the substantive context 
of the FDA’s regulation of software in medical devices, the exclusive 
nature of the regime meant that no other regulator could force such a 
conversation to take place, leaving open the possibility that a draft policy 
could remain in place, unchallenged for so long.279  
In addition to these concerns regarding regulatory uncertainty and 
potential for policy conflict lies a deeper question about whether advisory 
nonpreemption promotes or conflicts with norms of democratic 
legitimacy. This concern is not unique to advisory nonpreemption, but has 
been leveled at other informal agency actions.280 In this context there are 
two levels of debate over legitimacy. The first raises a separation of 
powers question—whether agencies are the right institution to preempt 
state action, and whether they have been properly authorized by Congress 
to do so in the first instance.281 Because advisory nonpreemption only 
 
 
277.  Cf. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERK. TECH. L.J. 175, 191–94 
(2014) (arguing that the FDA’s use of informal guidance to address substantive law became stale and 
outlived their usefulness). 
278.  Id. (acknowledging that the FDA’s pre-clearance procedure for medical devices 
counteracted some of these negative effects). 
279.  Id.  
280.  Strauss, supra note 103, at 804 (noting the ongoing debate over whether informal agency 
rules are “legitimate instruments of agency policy or a ruse to evade the higher procedural obligations 
associated with adopting regulations”).  
281.  See Young, supra note 40, at 878. Ernest Young, for example, argues that preemption by 
the executive branch in the absence of clear authorization by Congress is problematic even if the 
agency preempts via notice-and-comment rulemaking because “the deliberation assumed by ‘political 
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occurs in a context in which the agency has been delegated authority from 
Congress to interpret the statute, and has interpreted the particular 
provisions raising federalism concerns in the past—this first concern is not 
implicated here.  
The second level of concern relates to the informal nature of the agency 
action. The procedures set forth under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) for notice-and-comment rulemaking are designed to protect 
democratic legitimacy. In this context, democratic legitimacy means 
opportunities for public participation, transparency about agency actions 
and interpretations, and accountability, including the right of the public to 
challenge agency actions in the courts.282 Informal actions by agencies do 
not require publication of a proposed action, opportunities for comment by 
the public, responses by the agency to those comments, and opportunities 
for judicial review.283  
Despite this lack of formal procedures, many scholars have defended 
the use of informal agency actions on a number of grounds. For example, 
Peter Strauss has argued that such informal “publication” rules tend to 
dwarf the volume of notice-and-comment regulations, and that publication 
rules both promote consistent agency administration and fairness to the 
public through guidance on interpretation of regulations.284 Other 
prominent scholars of administrative law recognize the value of the third, 
least formal, category of agency action, including non-legislative rules, 
 
 
safeguards’ theories of federalism takes place among the states’ representatives in Congress, not 
among interest groups submitting comments to federal bureaucrats. Federal agencies, after all, have no 
mandate to represent state interests and possess strong countervailing incentives to maximize their own 
power and jurisdiction.” Id.  
282.  Merrill, supra note 36, at 1955–56 (distinguishing the positivist vision of legitimacy as 
rooted in legal authority in a statute or the Constitution from the process-based tradition in which 
legitimacy depends upon a process of “reasoned decision making,” and in which “all relevant 
interests” are heard); see also Gluck et al., supra note 36, at 1839 (discussing concerns about public 
participation, transparency, and accountability). In this case, NHTSA’s interpretation is authorized by 
Congress, addressing the positivist concern. However, accountability and transparency are certainly 
increased by a fair and open process for considering all relevant views under the process-based 
tradition. 
283.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). Under Sections 552(a)(1) and (2) of the APA, however, if the 
agency has published an informal rule, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation or even a staff 
manual or instruction, or if a party has “actual and timely notice” of its terms, the policy “may be 
relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than the agency.” The goal of 
Congress in adopting this provision, simultaneously with the enactment of the Freedom of Information 
Act in 1966, was to “end secret law, not additional proceduralization.” Strauss, supra note 103, at 806.  
284.  Strauss, supra note 103, at 808. Strauss notes that the APA describes three degrees of 
“force” of agency actions: “actions validly adopted pursuant to congressionally authorized rulemaking 
procedures have the kind of authority we commonly ascribe to statutes; actions that meet the public 
requirements of section 552(a) have such authority as we commonly ascribe to precedents; and in other 
cases, agencies are not permitted to treat their actions as having legal force on citizens.” Id. at 811.  
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policies, statements of best practices, and others.285 Tim Wu, for example, 
contends that agencies have three choices when it comes to substantive 
lawmaking under conditions of uncertainty: to make law, to “forgo any 
action” until uncertainty is resolved, or to “watch the growth of the 
industry and issue threats that indicate where it has concerns, and possibly 
the direction in which it hopes the industry will grow.”286 The first risks 
“premature lawmaking” that could “cripple” innovation, while the second 
option completely fails to protect the public interest.287 The third 
alternative, to make a “threat,” offers a balance that can “facilitate public 
debate.”288 Similar choices arise in the federalism context. The federal 
government could adopt a strict, dual federalism regime that preempts 
state experimentation, or a dynamic regime that permits concurrent action 
by the states and federal government, or could simply fail to regulate, 
leaving the states or private industry to govern essentially without federal 
oversight. The choice among these may be premature if the path of 
innovation is uncertain. And the wrong choice may completely fail to 
protect the public interest. Advisory nonpreemption can instigate the kind 
of debate over the proper allocation of regulatory authority to achieve the 
right balance. 
With respect to democratic accountability, the advantage of a flexible, 
temporary approach like advisory nonpreemption is that it can be amended 
more easily than notice-and-comment rulemaking.289 In this way, the 
political preferences of past regulators about the proper allocation of 
authority are not enshrined into the future where they outlive their 
usefulness or accuracy.290 The allocation of authority is more likely to be 
 
 
285.  Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 578–79 (2008) (advantages of soft law include influencing behavior and beliefs of 
the public and other lawmaking bodies); Strauss, supra note 103, at 804; Wu, supra note 34, at 1847; 
Zaring, supra note 83, at 294.  
286.  Wu, supra note 34, at 1848–49.  
287.  Id. at 1849–50.  
288.  Id. at 1851.  
289.  Strauss, supra note 103, at 812 (amendments to publication rules do not require notice-
and-comment rulemaking).  
290.  In the context of constitutional law, many scholars and political philosophers have 
rejected the idea that one generation should bind another. See Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh 
Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalists, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 2005 (2015) (discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty as an inter-temporal 
problem); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) 
(“[T]o the extent that [the constitution] ever represented the ‘voice of the people’ . . . it represents “the 
voice of people who have been dead for a century or two.”); David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in 
ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 452, 457 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (1741–1742) 
(rejecting the idea of “consent of the fathers to bind the children”); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the 
Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 111–12 (1997) (rejecting the idea that one generation can bind another through 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/6
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consistent with the state of fast-paced innovation.291 In the substantive 
regulatory context, Gluck et al. have argued that one facet of legitimacy 
that unorthodox methods advance is the “legitimacy of government getting 
its work done.”292 This argument has equal force in the federalism context. 
Advisory nonpreemption promotes a kind of democratic legitimacy in 
time—one in which a flexible approach allows the agency to offer its view 
on an initial allocation of power, but one that is subject to revision in time 
as more information is gathered. Thus, the allocation of authority will 
better reflect the needs of good policymaking, as well as the will of the 
people over time. When considering innovation and advisory 
nonpreemption, the question is not whether the benefits outweigh the 
costs, but rather, whether the benefits outweigh the costs for now. The 
answer to this question is a strong yes.  
CONCLUSION 
The rise of HAV technology offers a particularly compelling case study 
that highlights the need for flexible mechanisms that permit agencies to 
shift regulatory primacy in dialogue with the states, rather than enshrine it 
statically for the next many years. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act, with its 
jurisdictional division between vehicle and driver, could become obsolete 
with the rise of AVs if NHTSA does not work with the states to make it 
relevant in light of this innovative technology. And that Act is not likely to 
be the only statute that will face a federalism disruption. Federal agencies 
can use advisory nonpreemption to preserve a flexible allocation of 
regulatory authority between the federal government and the states to 
address innovative technologies that disrupt well-settled allocations of 
authority. NHTSA’s advisory nonpreemption sets a proposed default of 
federal uniform rules for vehicle safety, but keeps the boundaries of 
federalism fluid. This tool allows federal agencies to inject temporary 
flexibility into a dual federalism regime to address the uncertain and 
unpredictable paths that new technologies may follow. 
 
 
“perpetual Government”).  
291.  Wu, supra note 34, at 1851 (noting that a new administration can revise or reverse an 
agency “threat” according to its political preferences). Cf. Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy 
Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 553 (2008) (offering an economic justification for the principle that “the 
best policy choice in the face of uncertain outcomes depends critically on the reversibility of the 
policy”).  
292.  Gluck et al., supra note 36, at 1842.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
